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# GO WORLD

WINTER 1986-87 NO.46



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*The cover:* Two panels from a triptych by Toyohara Kunichika. The subject is an episode from the career of the 12th-century samurai Sato Tadanobu, who is depicted quelling an attacker with a go board.  
*Collection of Tanaka Fumio.*

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Go World is published by the Ishi Press, Inc.  
 Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.  
 CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan  
 Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (4 issues by seaimail)  
 Price per single issue: ¥1,250  
 Airmail rate: ¥1,800 per issue; ¥7,200 a year  
 (Discounts are available for bulk orders)

Prices for back issues 1–45: ¥1,200 @ (only a limited supply available for the earlier issues)

U.S. and Canadian subscribers should order from:

**THE ISHI PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.**  
 1101 San Antonio Road, Suite 302  
 Mountain View, California 94043

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Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

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## Go World News

### Kato Takes Meijin Title

In the most startling turnabout for some time in the go world, Kobayashi Koichi's long string of successes in title matches came to an abrupt end with a disastrous shut-out in the 11th Meijin title match. The challenger, Kato Masao, has been enjoying great form recently, but no one expected him to blanket the champion 4-0. Apart from the fact that he habitually does badly against Kato, one possible explanation for Kobayashi's poor performance was his serious lack of match practice going into the title match. As the holder of four titles, he had fewer opportunities to play than usual, and in

fact in the four and a third months going into the title match he played no tournament games at all, his only practice being three TV fast games. Considering that Kobayashi is the sort of player who thrives on competition and is at his best when he's playing a game a week, this had to be a handicap. Perhaps his lack of match practice explains why in this title match he showed an uncharacteristic inability to convert a lead into a win. As the essays on Kobayashi in this issue point out, winning 'won' games is supposed to be his forte, yet this series was noticeable for the upsets staged by Kato. Kobayashi was actually ahead at one stage or



*The 11th Meijin title match — an overwhelming triumph for Kato.*



another in all four games, but he seemed to have lost his knack of clinching a win. This particularly applied to the first two games, as the commentaries to be published in our next issue will make clear. Kobayashi refused to use his lack of practice as an excuse, but as his slump continued after the title match he must be a pretty worried man nowadays.

The above comments are not meant to take away any of the credit Kato deserves for his outstanding effort. At the moment he would sweep any poll to determine the number one player. Especially in view of his immense achievements in the past, a Meijin title has been long overdue for him. It was the ideal way for him to start his forties (he turns forty next March).

The results:

Game 1 (10, 11 Sept.). Kato (B) won by resig.  
Game 2 (17, 18 Sept.). Kato (W) won by  $\frac{1}{2}$  point.  
Game 3 (1, 2 Oct.). Kato (B) won by  $4\frac{1}{2}$  points.  
Game 4 (8, 9 Oct.). Kato (W) won by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  points.

#### Kato Defends Oza Title

Kato's good form didn't end with the Meijin title. In the 33rd Oza title match, which began while the Meijin title match was still in progress, he lost the first game to the challenger, Rin Kaiho, but then he swept the next three games to win this title for the fifth year in a row. This is a record for consecutive wins in the Oza title, and since Kato had two wins previously, he now draws level with Sakata's record of seven Oza titles.

The results:

Game 1 (26 Sept.). Rin (B) won by  $\frac{1}{2}$  point.  
Game 2 (16 Oct.). Kato (B) won by resig.  
Game 3 (5 Nov.). Kato (W) won by  $8\frac{1}{2}$  points.  
Game 4 (17 Nov.). Kato (B) won by  $6\frac{1}{2}$  points.

#### Sonoda Tengen Challenger

Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan is continuing his single-handed effort to uphold the honour of the Kansai Ki-in. He made up for his loss in the Gosei final by defeating Yamashiro in the Tengen final, played on 9 October. He then made a good start in the title match by defeating Kobayashi Koichi in 144 moves in the first game. He played his characteristic large-moyo style and managed to outfight Kobayashi in the centre. However, Kobayashi recovered to win the second game, so the match is now evenly poised.

The results:

Game 1 (13 Nov.). Sonoda (W) won by resig.  
Game 2 (28 Nov.). Kobayashi (W) won by  $3\frac{1}{2}$  points.

#### Kisei Challenger: Otake or Takemiya

The surprising run of the dark horse Ishikura 6-dan in the 11th Kisei tournament ended with his encounter with Otake in the semifinal. Ishikura found himself outgunned. In the other semifinal Takemiya defeated Cho Chikun, so he met Otake for the right to challenge Kobayashi Kisei. Otake made a good start in the playoff by winning the first game, played on 27 November.

*Late news:* The second game, played on 4 December, was won by Takemiya.



*Ogawa Tomoko – women's champion again*

#### Ogawa Tomoko Wins Women's Honinbo

After taking time off to have a baby, Ogawa Tomoko has made a comeback, winning the 5th Women's Honinbo Title 2-0 from Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan. She thus succeeded in breaking the domination of this title by the Honda sisters (Honda Sachiko and her sister Kusunoki alternated in the first four terms). It is Ogawa's first title in six years (she won the 27th and final Women's Championship, before it was reborn as the Women's Honinbo).

The results:

Game 1 (5 Nov.). Ogawa (W) won by resig.  
Game 2 (19 Nov.). Ogawa (B) won by  $4\frac{1}{2}$  points.



## 42nd Honinbo League (as of 30 November 1986)

| Rank | Player     | Y | C | R | K.K. | K | S | O | O.R. | Score |
|------|------------|---|---|---|------|---|---|---|------|-------|
| 1    | Yamashiro  | — |   |   |      |   |   | 1 | 1    | 2 — 0 |
| 2    | Cho Chikun |   | — |   |      | 1 | 1 |   |      | 2 — 0 |
| 3    | Rin Kaiho  |   |   | — |      | 1 | 1 |   |      | 2 — 0 |
| 4    | Kobayashi  |   |   |   | —    |   |   | 1 | 0    | 1 — 1 |
| 5    | Kato       |   | 0 | 0 |      | — |   |   |      | 0 — 2 |
| 5    | Sakata     |   | 0 | 0 |      |   | — |   |      | 0 — 2 |
| 5    | Otake      | 0 |   |   | 0    |   |   | — |      | 0 — 2 |
| 5    | O Rissei   | 0 |   |   | 1    |   |   |   | —    | 1 — 1 |

*Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.*

### 42nd Honinbo League

Some big games have already been played in the new Honinbo league. The previous challenger, Yamashiro Hiroshi, has got off to a good start by beating Otake and O Rissei, but Rin and Cho are level with him, both having scored victories against Kato and Sakata. Considering his great form recently, the wins against Kato are especially valuable.

Sakata, making a comeback to fulltime play after a period of semi-retirement, has got off to a shaky start, while Otake is demonstrating yet again that the Honinbo is just not his tournament (it's only rarely that he even manages to get into the league). The biggest upset so far has been the win scored by one of the newcomers to the league, O Rissei, against Kobayashi Koichi in the first round. Since Kobayashi recovered in the second round, this looks like being a hotly contested league.

### Shuko in Meijin League

Go fans will be glad to hear that the front-line career of the legendary Fujisawa Shuko is by no means over. In his first substantial achievement since his loss of the Kisei title in 1984 and the major stomach surgery that followed soon after, Shuko has won a place in the 12th Meijin league. Apparently he has not yet fully regained his old powers of concentration, but his presence will add greatly to the drama of the league and he may yet have some surprises up his sleeve.

Joining him in the new league are Otake Hideo, who fortunately made an immediate

comeback after his dismal performance in the previous league, and Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, making a reappearance after a gap of eight years.

### A Breakthrough for Michael Redmond

In retrospect, the autumn of 1986 may one day be seen as an important turning point in Michael Redmond's career. After starting the year well with four wins in January, thanks to which *Igo Club* selected him as the MIP or "most impressive player" of the month, Michael went into an



*In San Francisco this autumn with Ashida Isoko 6-dan (Kansai Ki-in) and Mr. Dote of the S.F. Go Club. Michael was a member of the large contingent of professionals, headed by Sakata 9-dan and Oeda 8-dan, which visited the 2nd U.S. Go Congress in Seattle.*



unaccountable slump. From February to August he was only able to win three out of 12 games. What hurt most was four losses in a row in the rating tournament. It seemed as if he was having trouble with the tougher competition he had to face since his promotion to 5-dan (players 5-dan and up start out in the 2nd preliminary round of the newspaper tournaments).

That all changed in October and changed in spectacular fashion: successive wins against 9-dans, the first of his career. On 2 October Michael defeated Kojima 9-dan in the Gosei 2nd preliminary, then followed that up on the 9th with a victory over Kada 9-dan in the 2nd preliminary round of the Judan (he had white in both games). On the 23rd, he also scored a win against Kanashima 8-dan, and ended up extending his winning streak to eight games. There's no doubt that his slump is behind him, but the wins against the 9-dans have even greater significance: they show that he can hold his own at the top level of competition. This speaks very well for his future prospects.

When we asked Michael if he could account for the turnabout in his results, he said that he did not feel that he had got any stronger. The only difference he was aware of was that he was able to play the fuseki faster, thus giving him more time for the difficult fighting of the middle game. The reason was that he has been doing less teaching recently and has spent his extra time studying the fuseki.

To show readers how he did it, we present the Kojima game on page 49.

### **Abe Finally Makes 9-dan**

After 12 years as an 8-dan and two missed chances for promotion, Abe Yoshiteru was beginning to think that he would end his days as a professional one rung away from the top of the ladder, but on 7 November this year he finally realized his ambition with a win on white against Shirae 7-dan. Abe may not star in title matches, but he is reputed to be one of the most studious of professionals, so he deserves his promotion.

Other recent promotions include those of Oya Koichi and Ishikura Noboru to 6-dan. Two promotions from the spring rating tournament that we neglected to report were those of Sato Masaharu to 9-dan and O Meien to 7-dan.



### **Death of Takagawa**

The go world lost one of its greatest figures with the death of Takagawa Shukaku, Honorary Honinbo, on 26 November. He was aged 71. Takagawa's greatest achievement was winning the Honinbo title nine years in a row, a record that may never be broken. He also won the Meijin title at the age of 53, thus disproving his own theory that 50 was the age limit for professional play at the top level. He retired in 1984, but after a long illness partly recovered his health. From 1980 to July this year he served as the president of the Nihon Ki-in Professional Go Players Society.



### **Death of Shinohara 9-dan**

Japanese go lost another veteran player with the death on 21 October of Shinohara Masami at the age of 82. Shinohara, who retired in 1984, did not win any titles, but during his career, which lasted 64 years, he lived through all the vicissitudes of modern go history in Japan.



He was known for his aggressive style and in his younger days was nicknamed 'the heavy tank'. His major achievement was the creation of the points system used in the rating tournament. He will also be remembered as Go Seigen's first opponent in Japan (victory in the game earned Go an immediate promotion to 3-dan).

#### **Japan Leads 8-4 in 2nd Japan-China Super Go**

Only the Chinese captain, Nie Weiping, stands in the way of an overwhelming victory by Japan in the 2nd Super Go match. Although Ma Xiaochun managed to stop Kobayashi Satoru from destroying the whole Chinese team, he promptly lost to the next player on the Japanese team, Kataoka Satoshi, so the Chinese have one player left to face the top five players on the Japanese team. The Nie-Kataoka game will be played in Peking on 4 December. If Nie wins, he has still to face Yamashiro, Sakai, Takemiya, and Otake.

#### **Go Book a Best-seller**

The latest book by Nakayama Noriyuki 5-dan, known to Western readers for his work *The Treasure Chest Enigma*, has entered the best-seller lists in Japan. The book is entitled *The World of Go*, and it was written as an introduction to the game and its cultural, social and historical background for both players and non-players. It even includes chapters on go in the west and computer go. It is the first go book to be included in the Iwanami Shinsho paperback series, a series which covers a wide range of intellectual topics and which has a great amount of prestige in Japan. Upon publication in June this year, it reached number two in the best-seller lists and has since been reprinted seven times, selling a total of over 70,000 copies. This kind of popularity for a go book is unprecedented. *Go World* plans to publish some sections of the book in future issues.

#### **1986 German Championship**

This year's German champion is Martin Dieterich 4-dan of Mainz, who triumphed over a 14-player field in a six-round tournament held on 1 to 4 May. Dieterich scored 5½ points, with one jigo against David Schoffel. Second was Karl-F. Lenz 5-dan (Munich) on 5 points, and third David Schoffel 5-dan (Cologne) on 4½ points. Fourth was Stefan Budig on 4.

#### **1986 Danish Go Championship**

This year's Championship was held from 24 to 26 October in Copenhagen and was won by Ulrik Bro-Jorgensen 1-dan. Frank Hansen was second and Morten Mortensen third.

#### **1986 Finnish Championship**

The 1986 Finnish Championship was held in October and the top section was won by Vesa Laatikainen 2-dan. Second was Lauri Paatero 2-dan and third Matti Siivola 3-dan.

#### **1st Romanian Go Championship**

The first national go championship in Romania was held on 1-4 May this year and was organized by the go club in Cluj-Napoca. Sixty-four players participated in the 7-round Swiss, which was won by Zhang Haitao 3-dan of China. Zhang is studying for his Ph.D. in mathematics in Romania. Second was Baciú Radu 3-dan of Bucarest and third Basca Mihai 1-dan, also of Bucarest.

Go is beginning to prosper in Romania and there are now 22 go clubs. Since an introduction to go written by Dr. Gheorghe Paun has sold 50,000 copies, while around 100,000 go sets have been sold, the go population can probably be estimated at over 10,000.

#### **Macfadyen Wins British Challengers League**

The 1986 British Challengers League was won by the ex-champion, Matthew Macfadyen, who scored seven straight wins. He not only earned the right to challenge the current champion Terry Stacey for the British title but also a free trip to China. Second place was taken by Piers Shepperson 3-dan on 5½ and third by Jim Barty 4-dan on 4½. The fourth-place getter, Harold Lee, who played above his 2-dan rating in scoring 4 points, joins the above players in retaining his place in the league.

#### **Correction**

We apologise for the blurred printing at the bottom of page 45 in GW45. The last two lines on the page should read:

Dia. 1. If White blocks at 1, Black can set up a ko with 4 and 6. . . .

*More news on page 64*



## 2nd Japan-China TV Championship

Once a year a TV game is played between the NHK champion and a top Chinese player. This game is billed as a TV championship, but unfortunately there is not yet a regular go program on Chinese TV, so the Chinese representative is selected on the basis of his results in ordinary tournaments. The game is sponsored by NHK and CCTV (Chinese Central TV) and is telecast in both countries.

In the inaugural game, held in Japan in 1985, Ma Xiaochun of China defeated Hashimoto Shoji, winner of the 32nd NHK Cup. This year the Japanese representative was Kobayashi Koichi, who was not only the winner of the 33rd Cup but also the holder of four top titles. To match him, the Chinese side played Nie Weiping, who had defeated Kobayashi in the 1st NEC Super Go. To date, this has been Kobayashi's only loss to a Chinese player, so he was undoubtedly eager to take revenge.

**White:** Nie Weiping 9-dan

**Black:** Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin, Judan & Tengen. Played on 17 August 1986 in Peking (telecast in Japan on 10 October).

*Commentary by Kobayashi.*




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

**Figure 1 (1 - 50)**

Black 9 feels right here. White 10 was a resolute move. Nie's idea presumably was that since Black 7 was on the third line, forcing

Black into a low position all along the bottom would not lose him anything, but I was grateful for the chance to play at 11.

White 16 gave Black the chance to invade at 17. This position was difficult, but reinforcing the right side, by capping at 'a', for example, appears superior.

Black 17. The only move. White has no choice but to answer at 18, so the sequence to 25 is forced. White would like to cut at 41, but doing so immediately would be unreasonable. The invasion at 26 is the only move. Instead of 27, the strongest move is 29, but it would be risky.

White cannot omit 36 because of the threat of Black 'b'. Black 37 defends against the cut of White 41 — I thought that it felt right. If White answers at 38, Black gains by the exchange. The fighting comes to a pause with 42.

Black 45. The two-space extension to 49 is the conventional move, but then White 'c' would become a good point, so Black 49 somehow feels cramped and unappealing. I decided to try a special strategy here.

The invasion of 46 is only natural. The continuation to 55 seems forced.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

**Figure 2 (51 - 100)**

White 58. I have my doubts about this move. Presumably Nie didn't want me to slide in at 'a', but I felt grateful for the exchange for 59.

White 60 and 62 reinforce the white group



while also reducing Black's territory.

White 88 and 90 are dubious. Letting Black block off the center so easily with 91 gives him a good position. The white group on the right is thin, so Black has various sente moves against it; this means there is strong possibility of Black's getting a large area in the centre. It is difficult to say specifically what White should have done, but he had to try something here.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)  
45: ko

### Figure 3 (101 - 150)

With 5 I was confident that the game was mine. Black can still aim at splitting White with 'a'.

Nie called 22 the losing move. He didn't expect Black to ignore it. Even if he used 22 to connect at 30, however, he would still have been behind.

White 40. Being behind, White can't answer docilely at 41. Black 43 is the only ko threat on the board big enough, so a trade follows. Capturing two stones with 46 at 'b' would not secure life for the group.

### Figure 4 (151 - 193)

Black 77 wraps the game up, though even without it Black is over 20 points ahead on the board.

White 80. Even if White connects at 1 in Dia. 1, Black plays 2 to 6 in sente, then uses the tesuji clamp of 8 to get one eye here, so a ko follows in the corner.





Figure 4 (151 - 193)  
81: ko



Dia. 1


Kobayashi is one of the best-known Japanese go players in China and no wonder. This was his 13th win in a row in games played in China. It was also his third win out of four games against Nie.

*White resigns after Black 193.*

## Making Shape

### Shirae 7-dan

In the problem below, Black's position seems to be in tatters, but he has a surprisingly effective way of making shape. Can you find the tesuji?



Black to play  
Answer on page 21



# The Bard of Computer Go

Jonathan Wood

I managed to meet Allan Scarff, developer of *Microgo 1* and 2, and the planner of the extraordinary *Microgo 3*, while he was in Japan in September 1986 to prepare his *Microgo 1* program for Nintendo's Family Computer. We talked amid the beeps and whirrs of Henk Rogers' Bullet-Proof Software workshop.

*Microgo 1* went through its paces in the background, black and white stones leaping from their bowls to land on the board and captures high-diving off. Rogers, who has put Bruce Wilcox's *Nemesis* program on the Japanese market for the NEC 9801 Series and set up the deal with Nintendo, introduced us and the interview was on.

It may seem far-fetched to call a computer programmer a poet/dramatist, but for Allan Scarff, who has spent most of his life in Stratford-on-Avon, attended the same school that Shakespeare did, and expresses his views on the learning process and the world of computer go with such striking originality, it is entirely appropriate.

Scarff is the father of three teenagers and

his hobbies include walking and mycology (the study of fungi). He attended St. Andrews University, majoring in physics, and then became involved in computers. He learned to play go at age 19 while at college. It wasn't an auspicious start. 'I only played one person and we played the wrong ko rule for two years. Then I didn't play anybody for about seven years, until I went to Reading and joined ICL [International Computers, Ltd., the only British computer manufacturer].' He is now ranked as a strong 1-dan.

He spent twelve years with ICL, gaining a lot of experience in expert systems and databases. He was the project manager of IDMS, a major database system. Scarff was then chosen to design a self-organizing database for an automated office for ICL, but the project was shelved due to problems in the company. 'I had what I considered to be the most advanced database design in the world, but I couldn't get anybody interested in it. So I decided, dammit, I'll do a go program.'

That was about three years ago. He had done a series of articles on writing go programs for



*Slaving away at the BPS workbench*





*In conference with BPS staff*

*Computer Video Games* prior to that. 'When I started the series, I felt it was impossible to do anything sensible with a go program. But, having written the series, I thought I'd better justify it.'

The road to *Microgo 1* began, ironically enough, with Bruce Wilcox's *Instant Go* series, which started Scarff believing that there was something possible in programming go. 'The one theory I liked was sector lines. I looked at that and felt there was something much better. The reason I felt that way was Iwamoto 9-dan. I saw him some years ago, and when asked what go was all about, he simply did this [with his forefinger, Scarff drew an outline of a circle in the air about the size of a go board]. From that I had the idea that go is about boundaries. You know, like soap bubbles. You put several soap bubbles together and they rearrange themselves so the boundaries are efficient.'

It took him six months to program *Microgo 1*, from May 1983 to November 1983. It came out on the market in 1984 for the BBC Micro and later for Commodore. 'I sold 4,000 and there are about ten illegal copies for each one you sell, so there are about 40,000 games out there,' he says. '[But] four thousand is a lousy number to

sell because the copy license is so low in the UK.'

Scarff saw the whole project as a learning experience, and he indeed learned a lot, including marketing techniques and how to teach go. 'I just hoped I'd make some money. In fact, I broke even, which was like losing money for someone like me at the top of my profession. I could earn very large consultancy fees and I'm giving all that up to do this.' He doesn't seem to regret his decision, though. 'This is something that's more interesting, and actually there are more prospects. It's just that they're always down the line.'

What makes *Microgo 1* tick? 'It has no look-ahead,' according to Scarff. 'It just plays promising-looking moves.' It doesn't use shape patterns, as does Wilcox's program. Instead, it is based on the concept of cellular automata, which was the idea behind Conway's *Life*, a popular computer game a few years ago. You have a number of single cells, and there's a simple rule saying which of those cells die out and which cells grow. From very unpromising starts you get fantastic patterns.' He adds, 'You have highly organized structures coming out of chaos. And, obviously, if you think about it, go is a

similar sort of problem. If you look at the board, it's chaos and you're trying to impose order on it. That's why I used cellular automata.'

Or, to put it another way, 'I have a set of cellular automaton rules which makes an evaluation of the board — what's alive, what's dead, where the candidate moves should be, the boundaries, this sort of thing. Now, the sophisticated thing is the evaluation. Basically, I'm taking the stones as seeds, or cells, and growing patterns from them. I have an idea of what a group of stones is in the human sense and what are potential groups, whereas most go programs have no idea what groups are. They know what's connected, and they have some idea that this isn't very close to this, but when you've got stones cutting each other, and there's a stone in the middle here, is it alive, is it dead, is it joining onto this, whatever, it can become confusing.

'I looked at cellular automata as a method of giving a holistic evaluation of go. The advantage of it is that you put all the rules into one set of rules which generates something. It's not like having all the go proverbs. They contradict themselves all the time. And the problem that Wilcox has got is the more rules he puts in, the more contradictions he's got, so it becomes more and more difficult to add more rules. I was interested in cellular automata as a way of coordinating the rules, because what it gave you was a cohesive pattern-forming, decision-making setup and it did it in a very small space. Wilcox's program is in 256 kilobytes. *Microgo 1* runs in 17 kilobytes.'

Scarff's main goal in creating *Microgo 1* was to make a game that played quickly and was fun to play. He put a lot of variability into it, including inferior moves just to make it interesting. 'It sees the first possibly good move and says, "Ha! Finished!" and plays that move. Sometimes it comes up with brilliant moves, sometimes bad moves.' It only plays on a 9x9 board, and he estimates its playing level at 25- to 15-kyu at best.

*Microgo 1* was only the beginning, and it didn't take Scarff long to get busy on his next project. 'I started *Microgo 2* in March of '85. It's basically trying to do the same thing as *Microgo 1*, but properly, because there were so many corners cut to get it into a very small

machine and to use different techniques to get the same sort of results which were then capable of more development. And to that end I've been successful, although it took me a year longer than I wanted. But in doing that, I discovered much better ways of doing things.'

He adds, 'I've tried to make *Microgo 2* more like a human player. It has a much wider repertoire. It still has variability, but it won't choose an inferior move like *Microgo 1* sometimes does. It will choose randomly from among good moves that are approximately equivalent.' It will also play on a 19x19 board, though Scarff isn't happy about the possible 30 seconds per move it will take in the final version.

If strength is defined as playing against humans in a tournament (as Wilcox defines it), Scarff is 'looking for *Microgo 2* to be 10-kyu. And Wilcox is trying to make his version 10-kyu, too. But it's not the same thing as saying it's a human 10-kyu because of the limited repertoire.'



Creating a program, no matter how good it is, is only half the battle, however. The rest is selling it. As Scarff says, 'I spent a lot of time developing *Microgo 2* and now I could spend an equal amount of time getting it into the world market. I'm looking for someone else to do that and get me some money as well.' Having someone else do the marketing would free Scarff for what he really wants to do — Act III.

The final act of Scarff's historical drama *Microgo* will be a fitting climax to what has gone before. *Microgo 3* will be dan-level or near dan-level and it will be able to learn on its own.

The key is the learning ability. Scarff says, 'To do anything strong, I think you have to have



an automatic process, a learning machine which learns how to do things and invents new rules. It could be done manually, but it would take an enormous amount of effort.' Scarff is confident that he could make such a machine for *Microgo 2*, one that could invent the rules for it, and he says, 'I don't really see why I can't extend it upwards. I think I've got enough of an idea to make it a possibility.'

The way to make it learn is not quite so simple. Scarff has done much study on the processes of learning and perception, and it is from this research that he believes the way to build a learning machine for go will come. He wants it to be able to play the way humans do, at least to some extent. 'People look at things and they have an idea, though they don't consciously know how they got the idea. You see things automatically in groups [of stones]. What I'm trying to do is do the intuition part of the human because I think that's the most important bit. Once you have that intuition, you apply formal rules. The intuition is like realizing that a group is killable and what the vital points in it are, while applying the rules is reading out the moves and their timing to kill the group.'

Scarff's background in expert systems should help him in finding programmable bits of information to help out with the 'intuition' part of the program. He says, 'I'm interested in watching professionals play and how long it takes them for each move. I have to see what they do and how they do it directly and then ask them questions in tight corners. If you ask little questions, which are specific, about a situation that's just happened, you often get a lot of insight into what's going on. It's the throwaway information, which the expert doesn't think is important, that matters. If you ask an expert, "How did you play this so well?" they'll think of all sorts of reasons, but the throwaway, "Oh, I always play that move," when there's a crosscut or something like that is important to know.'

But an expert system isn't enough — it's not intelligence. For Scarff, 'Intelligence is more about coming up with new answers to unique situations from little information quickly. So for a really intelligent go machine, you just have to teach it the rules of go and from then

on it just gets stronger and stronger and stronger.' He's not sure how he can do this yet, however. He's thinking more of a learning machine with some of this ability, which can also be taught rules. 'You can say to it, this is a good situation because you have good thickness. It will say, "What?" It will then have some way of abstracting information about thickness under guidance and trying it out to see how well it works.'

It does this based on the concept of set theory. When we look at things, we put them into categories and these categories have association with other categories. It leads to an overlapped set of associations. According to Scarff, another way of looking at intelligence is that it is 'simply finding which set of categories is the most appropriate for the concept you're talking about.' The key to this learning process is to find these appropriate sets, which the machine would do by trying things out.

Scarff says, 'You do this enough times and you come up with things that are associated. The goal is easy: you simply say play the moves that actually make you win. It knows which moves make you win or not by analysing the board just like we do. The way it analyses it is, this is strong, this is weak, this is pretty shape, just like we do. Those concepts are built up from the basic concepts of eyes, liberties, and so on. So when it says a group is weak, it has a whole set of concepts which it associates with being weak.'

You can then teach it something new, saying that a group it thought was strong is really weak, which forces it to find out why the group is weak. It will try to find concepts that fit the fact that it's weak, which leads to a re-evaluation of its other ideas like thickness. 'It is,' says Scarff, 'very subtle. It's what I think humans are doing, so that's what I'm doing. There are some things about it which are very simple, and some things which are very complicated. But the experiments I've done are very promising. Very exciting. I think it's a probability.'

How strong such a 'go machine' would be is not certain, but Scarff believes this system is the only way to approach having anything higher than kyu-level. 'I think the estimate of Wilcox that at the end of the century we might have a shodan



*With Henk Rogers (imbibing) and two members of the BPS staff*

program if we go on the way we are is probably accurate. I'm looking for a shodan program in two years.'

In fact, says Scarff, 'In principle, it's easy to produce a dan-level program. The only problem is that it would take a very, very long time for each move. For example, a twenty-move sequence with ten candidate moves at each stage would take a supercomputer calculating a million sequences a second over three million years to select a move. It's just not realistic.'

If he succeeds in his quest for an 'intelligent' go-playing machine, Scarff doesn't intend to stop there. 'I'm not sure how applicable this is generally. Go is a very interesting game, it's not as boring as chess or these other calculating games, so I think it has some scope. For instance, I think it's quite possible to set up a machine for stockbrokers. If the whole thing's completely random, then a random program will work just as well as a stockbroker. But it isn't random, so there is a pattern or patterns there. You just

have to find them. You're looking for principles, underlying principles, so it's no different from go in that respect.'

Nor does he want to stop even there. 'The idea I've got is that I'd have dozens of these machines making money for me,' he adds.

But this is all in the rose-tinted future, as Scarff well knows. His more immediate problem is that of almost any pioneer: finding a source of income to keep him going. 'I want to do *Microgo 3*. I don't know if I'm going to get the money to do it. That's the trouble. I had quite a lot of money in the bank three years ago — I've got nothing now. This is venture capital with risk of a high order.'

So there it rests. Scarff's hoping to make a profit in Japan from the Nintendo deal. It would help him scratch his itch to get to work on *Microgo 3*. Meanwhile, we in the audience applaud each development and await the outcome with sweet anticipation.



# 1986 Japan-China Go Exchange: Sonoda v. Ma

As reported in the news section of GW44, the 14th Japan-China Go Exchange was yet another triumph for the Chinese side, which won 31 of the 56 games played on its tour of Japan from 27 April to 18 May this year. The Chinese scored 31 wins to 25 losses in seven matches against Japanese teams. The only bright spot for the home side was that it managed to score an 8-8 tie in the best-of-three individual matches that have been a feature of these tours since 1984.

Below we would like to present what was undoubtedly the most spectacular game of the tour. It also happens to be one of those Sonoda games we promised the reader in our last issue. Played in his best-of-three match against the youthful Chinese star Ma Xiaochun, it is an eye-opening example of just how bad a game can look for the eventual winner.


White: Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan

Black: Ma Xiaochun 9-dan

Played in Osaka on 15 May 1986.



Sonoda Yuichi



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

## Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Sonoda said that it was the first time in ten years that he had played 10. He didn't expect Black 11, but White 12 was the instinctive answer. For Black 17, he expected Ma to hane at 'a'; White 'b' and Black 18 would follow, after which White would have to choose between playing at 17 and jumping to 20 (the latter

probably being superior).

White 18 is the vital point. If Black omits 19, White puts him on the spot with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

White 22. Essential to forestall Black 'f'.

White 26. The key point overall. If instead White invaded the corner at 41, Black would take sente there and jump to 34. The continuation to 35 in the game is natural.

White 40 is actually part of a sacrifice strategy. White's real aim is to pull out his centre stone with 50. If White wanted to live in the corner, he could do so by playing 44 at 1 in Dia. 1. Sonoda considered this bad for White, as he loses 'a'.

White 48 makes 50 possible — if Black 'g', White plays both 'h' and 'i' in sente, destroying Black's ladder.

## Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Sonoda was satisfied with the result to 62. Black has an enormous area on the right side, but he has some very bad aji.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 74. The only move.

Black 83 is a sharp counterattack. Sonoda regretted not following Dia. 2 with 82. (Black 2 defends against White 'a'.)

White 96. White 'a' would make it harder for Black to do anything in the centre. Black 97 leads to a very difficult fight.






Figure 3 (101 - 124)

Figure 3 (101 - 124)


White cannot stop Black from settling his group in the centre. Black 5 is the key move: it aims at a black hane at 12. White counters with 6 etc., but finally is compelled to save his two stones with 12. The whole sequence to 15 is an inevitable one. Sonoda was satisfied because he




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

was confident he had enough territory at the top to take a lead.

White 16 starts some very complicated fighting: Black has bad aji in his side territory and White hopes to exploit it. He cannot hope to live, but that is not his aim.

Black 19. White wants Black to play 1 in Dia. 3. After 2 to 9 -

Dia. 4. The continuation to 14 is forced, but this is bad for Black, as White's capture of two stones with 13 becomes sente. That is why he plays 19 in the figure, but even this way White



Dia. 6

could capture the two stones in sente.

White 22. 'A terrible move,' lamented Sonoda. Capturing at 1 in Dia. 5 is the only move: that would once again make capturing the two stones at the bottom sente. After 1, Black has no choice but to attack White's eye shape with 2 and 4. After 6 -

Dia. 6. White forces with 1 and 3, then plays the same sequence as in Dia. 4. White 15 is



sente: Black must play 16 to forestall White 'a'. This result would clearly put White ahead.

Sonoda made the snap judgement that White 22 would lead to the same result but he reckoned without Ma's very clever move at 25 in the next figure. He went pale when he saw it.




Figure 4 (125 - 160)

Figure 4 (125 - 160)

Black 25 punishes White for his mistake in timing. If White 'a', Black 'b' restricts him to one eye; if instead White 'c', Black links up with 'b', and White's attack goes nowhere.

Sonoda: 'When Ma played 25, I thought for a moment that I had lost. However, when I got over the shock and made a calm calculation of the score, I found I was still a little ahead. I felt relieved, but at the same time I kept telling myself to stay cool.'

That Sonoda managed to keep his cool is shown by the methodical way he played his series of forcing moves up to 32, then took the last big point with 34. When he played this last move, he was again confident of a win. (Note that White 30 gains four points. If White did nothing here, letting Black capture with 43, then later Black could hane at 'd' in sente. In contrast, when he captures with 41, White can play 42 in sente.)

Figure 5 (161 - 206)

When Black resigned, White was ahead by  $1\frac{1}{2}$  points. The margin was small but decisive. What was most impressive about Sonoda's play in this game was that although it was the decider of the




Figure 5 (161 - 206)

best-of-three series with Ma, he stuck to his favourite large-moyo strategy, despite its risks. Shiraishi 9-dan, a fellow Kansai Ki-in player, commented: 'Old Sonoda's in great form. You have to give him credit for playing his own game. He gave full rein to his fighting instincts.'

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This game stood out in the Japan-China series, but there were many other interesting encounters, especially the showdown on the top board between Kato and Nie in the first best-of-three series. We hope to present more games in a later issue. Some games from the tour will also appear in the 1987 *Ranka Yearbook*, to be published next spring.

(Translated by John Power)



A disappointing conclusion to the tour for Ma

# Return of 'Kato the Killer'

Kato Masao has finally taken the Meijin title, a prize that is long overdue, considering the length and eminence of his career. Surprisingly, the title-holder, Kobayashi Koichi, put up very little resistance, but actually Kato has always done well against Kobayashi, if you exclude his losses in the Judan title match in 1984 and the Kisei playoff in 1985. Rather, Kato's nemesis has been Cho Chikun, who rebuffed his previous challenge for the Meijin title, in 1980, by the same margin with which Kato won it this year. Consequently, Kato probably felt that the main hurdle for him was not the title match itself but the league playoff with Cho Chikun.

When he was younger, Kato was known as 'the killer', a nickname which paid tribute to his fondness for attacking and to his knack for killing large groups. These days he plays a more balanced game but on occasion his youthful instincts reassert themselves. The league playoff was one of these occasions. The game, given below, was quite a shock for Cho.

## 11th Meijin League Playoff

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 25 August 1986.




Figure 1 (1 - 73)

Figure 1 (1 - 73)

The scene is set with the fight on the right side. It started when White countered 45 by pushing up at 46 instead of submitting with White 47. The real trouble starts with Kato's





Figure 2 (74 - 103)



placement at 73.

Figure 2 (74 - 103)

The aim of the placement was to set up forcing moves on the outside. White could have lived if he had chosen to, but Cho again refused to play passively. Rather than secure two eyes with White 81, he made a ponnuki with 80.

Kato could hardly let Cho get away with such open defiance, so he destroyed his eye shape with 81. Cho must have believed that he could save the group with 82 and 84, so it became a question of whose analysis was superior. Cho's hopes were pinned on his counterattack at 88.

Black 91 sets up the sequence in Dia. 1. Black captures the two pivotal stones. (If White 4 at 'a', Black 'b'.) This threat is a burden on White in the ensuing fight.

Black 93. A clever move. If Black simply blocked at 1 in Dia. 2, White would play 2 to 10, leading to an approach-move ko. White has any number of ko threats.

White 94. If at 1 in Dia. 3, Black has the clever tesuji of 4. His group lives after 6, so White dies.

White 96. White finally defends against the

*Continued on page 21.*



## 2nd NEC Japan-China Super Go

Kobayashi Satoru v. Jiang

### *Revenge for Japan*

The second Super Go series has been a nice contrast to the first for the Japanese team. This time the Japanese took the early lead, with one player almost disposing of the whole Chinese team. Last year the second batter for the Chinese, Jiang Zhujiu, then 7-dan, defeated five members of the eight-man Japanese team. This year Kobayashi Satoru, one of Jiang's victims, redeemed himself for his failure last year by defeating five Chinese players (in the 2nd series, the teams have nine players). The second-last player on the Chinese team, Ma Xiaochun, managed to keep their hopes alive by putting a stop to Kobayashi's winning run, but with the stronger half of the Japanese team still to come, the Chinese are definitely the underdogs.

The series started with Rui Naiwei 7-dan, one of the top three Chinese woman players, defeating Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan (Japanese Women's Honinbo) and Morita Michihiro 2-dan. Imamura Toshiya 7-dan (Kansai Ki-in) evened the score by defeating Rui and the other woman on the Chinese team, Zhang Xuan 6-dan, but then lost to Qian Yuping 7-dan, so once again China took the lead. However, Kobayashi Satoru then began his run, defeating Qian, Shao 7-dan, Tsao 9-dan, Jiang 8-dan, and Liu 8-dan, putting Japan ahead by 7 to 3.

Undoubtedly, the most gratifying victory for Kobayashi was when he took his revenge against Jiang. Here is his commentary on that game.

### Kobayashi Satoru v. Jiang

White: Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan

Black: Jiang Zhujiu 8-dan

Played on 2 August 1986 at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo. *Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru.*


To tell the truth, it was more than I expected to be chosen again for the Japanese team. I felt lucky to be given a second chance to appear on stage after my miserable performance last year. [The game is given in the 1986 *Ranka Yearbook*.] To exaggerate a little, it was like being resurrected from the dead. My goal initially was just to pick up one win; my actual results are better than I deserve.



*Kobayashi Satoru, the star of the 2nd series*

Having evened the score with Jiang for last year, I feel that I've done my duty by my team. Not that I've any intention of slackening off. One more win, two more . . . I mustn't be greedy. Better to take each game as it comes.

Let's review my game with Jiang.




*Figure 1 (1 – 50)*

### Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Fluctuating fortunes*

My first bad move was making the sanren-sei with 12. It became very slack when Black entered at the 3–3 point with 13. White 12 should have been at 'a'.

The invasion of White 30 started the first round of fighting. To be honest, I was grateful




*Dia. 1*

8: ko

when Black answered 38 by making an approach move at 39. I was very relieved to be able to fix up my shape in sente with 40 to 44. I would have found Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 quite disagreeable. The result to 13 would not have been to White's liking.

#### *Otake's Fuseki Workshop*


In a separate commentary on this game, Otake Hideo, the Japanese team captain, had some interesting comments on the fuseki. First of all, he surmised that Black's sanren-sei and his extension to 11 were part of a preconceived strategy (the colours alternate, so the players know beforehand what colour they are going to have). Black 11 is a new move which makes it difficult for White to invade at the 3-3 point in the top right corner. The reason —



*Dia. 2*

*Dia. 2.* If White 1, then after the usual moves to 7 Black can play the severe move of 8. If then White 9 to 13, Black counters with 14 and 16. White cannot play this ko because there are no ko threats at this stage of the game, so he collapses. This means that White can't make the hane at 9, so the 3-3 invasion is not interesting.


Otake agreed with Kobayashi's comment about White 12. He mentioned that he learnt about 'a' in a study group led by Fujisawa Shuko. He approved of Kobayashi's decision to hane at 18. If instead White plays the standard joseki of 1




*Dia. 3*

to 7 in Dia. 3, then Black builds up his moyo with 8 and 10. In contrast to White's moyo, which is confined to the bottom, Black's is developing on a global scale.

Jiang's 27 aroused controversy, according to Otake, with a lot of people advocating tenuki in favour of enclosing the top right with Black 40. Dia. 4 shows that White cannot make a really severe attack on Black. White might play 1 at 4, but then that leaves Black with the aji of 'a'.



*Dia. 4*




*Dia. 5*

Otake also gave an alternative to Jiang's 29. This move works well to secure the corner, but it makes it easy for White to invade on the outside, as he does at 30. Black 40 would make it tougher for White. If White invaded the corner at 1 in Dia. 5, Black would make excellent shape with 2 to 8.

White 34 is a clever move. Although it didn't appear in the game, this move aims at settling the group with the crosscut in Dia. 6.

(*'Go Weekly'*, 2 September 1986)



*Dia. 6*






Figure 2 (51 - 80)  
76: connects

**Figure 2 (51 - 80). *The Jiang style***

The contact play at 53 astonished me. I hadn't analysed this move at all — perhaps it's the so-called Jiang style. He's very skilful at starting fighting in unexpected places like this.

The fact that I played bad moves with 54 and 56 shows how disconcerted I was. Letting Black play 57 was pathetic. With 54, I should have descended at 57; if then Black 'a', I could have answered patiently at 71.

White lost some points in the furikawari (exchange) to 71, but I did not think I had a bad game. However, the lead was shifting subtly.

**Figure 3 (81 - 110). *Favoured by luck***

In this figure, both of us made mistakes. First, I went wrong with 86. Pushing through was bad, as it let Black create a defect in White's shape with 87 and 89. I should have ataried at 1 in Dia. 7: this would not give Black any aji to play around with. He would probably play 2 and 4, whereupon White could set about expanding his centre with 5. This way White's prospects would be good.

On the day of this game I had a bit of a cold; on top of that, when I was coming back from lunch I got drenched in a sudden downpour. Misfortunes never come singly — and the game was not going well for me either!

However, Fortune did not desert me.

When Black attacked at 97, I was put on the






Figure 3 (81 - 110)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

spot. Having nothing better, I pushed through with 98 (this is not a good move); Black then continued with the slack move of 99.

I could not believe my eyes. In this kind of position, Jiang would normally have no hesitation in playing at 1 in Dia. 8. All White can do is cut at 2, but that only sets up the textbook tesuji of 3 to 7 for Black. He then descends at 9, and White is in a whole lot of trouble. Cutting with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' is bad because of Black's counter at 'd'.

When I managed to avoid this crisis by poking my head out at 100, the game seems to have become promising for me.




Figure 4 (111 - 154)

Continued from page 17.

threat of Dia. 1, but Black's centre group is safe, so he takes care of the corner with 97. If White 'a' after 99, Black hanes at 'b' and White cannot cut at 'c' (if he does, Black uses his ataris above 'a' and above 98 to capture the four white stones above).

#### Figure 4 (111 - 154). Four in a row

White's cut with 106 and 108 in the previous figure started the last fight of the game. When he captured two stones with 32, White's last source of anxiety was eliminated. The final attack at 42 wound up the game.

Black had to resign after 54. He must now add a stone at 'a', but then his centre group will be lost.

This made it four wins in a row, but both in this game and in the game against Qian Yuping 7-dan I had more than my fair share of luck. Having come this far, however, I intend to fight even harder.

('Igo Club', October 1986. Translated by John Power.)


One does not often see Cho outread like this. In recent years, Kato has curbed his natural aggressiveness, but when push comes to shove he still knows how to handle himself in a fight.

*White resigns after Black 103.*

(Adapted from the Asahi)

#### Tesuji Problem

It is impossible for the black group at the top to make two eyes, so the only way to save it is to link up to the black group below. How does Black accomplish this?




Black to play

Answer on page 53


#### Making Shape: Answer

Continued from page 8.

Dia. 1. To begin with, Black 1 is the only possible move, but the point of this problem is discovering the sacrifice of 3. Giving up two stones enables Black to get an all-round squeeze in sente with 5 and 9. Black 11 then becomes an excellent follow-up. Black is very satisfied.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If Black is stingy and refuses to make the sacrifice, he ends in gote, so White can attack at 8. If White 4 at 'a', followed by Black 'b', White 5, then Black counters with 'c', White 'd', Black 4, getting a ladder.

('Igo Club', April 1984)



# 41st Honinbo Title

In our previous issue, we gave the first two games of the 1986 Honinbo title match. Below we present the remaining three games. As the commentary will show, the series was by no means a walkover for Takemiya and at times he was in fact skating on very thin ice, particularly in the third game. If his opponent had had a little more big-match experience, the result might have been very different. The turning point of the series was probably the third game; his failure to clinch what should have been a win here was what turned the tide against Yamashiro.

## Game Three

**White:** Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

**Black:** Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan

**Komi:** 5½; **time:** 9 hours each.

Played on 5, 6 June 1986 at Unzen, Nagasaki prefecture. *Commentary by Takemiya.*

The Honinbo title match has ended smoothly, right on schedule. (Actually this is a lie. The score when this article was written was 3–1. But I intend to finish the series off in the 5th game, so the opening sentence should be safe. Please don't take it the wrong way, Yamashiro.)

Praise for a defeated opponent may seem like sarcasm, but, as I had expected, I found Yamashiro a very tough customer. He shows admirable fighting spirit and, above all, the quality of his go is high. The only comment I might make is that it still lacks a certain refinement. For that reason, I think that he probably learnt a lot from this title match, playing an exemplar of refinement like myself. The polish he must have acquired will make him a more formidable player in the future.

With the score tied at 1–1, this was the decisive game of the series. It was one of my rare bad games and I felt most unhappy while playing it. If it were someone else's game, I would have dismissed it out of hand as unworthy of the name of go. In my commentary, I hope to show you how I persevered with a hopeless position and turned it into an upset and how Yamashiro let slip an excellent game through an attack of nerves.

**Figure 1 (1 – 40).** *Could this be a Takemiya game?*

Each side has his own opinion about the shape at the bottom right. I consider that the combination of 10 and 12 makes White thick, while Yamashiro thinks that the result is all right for Black as the pincer of 11 is in a good position.

White 16 is terrible. Thinking too long about





Figure 1 (1 – 40)




Dia. 1

a move leads nowhere. I assumed that permitting Black to press at 17 wouldn't matter, as White had a stone in the bottom left corner, but this was a big mistake.

**Dia. 1.** I find it difficult to understand why I didn't play the majestic combination of 1 and 3. If White builds thickness here, he could even aim at invading the right side.

Black 19 is a sharp move, typical of Yamashiro. Locally, Black 1 in Dia. 2 is probably the correct move, but I was ready with the attachment at 2. Black 'a' is submissive, so Black will counter with 3, but then White makes shape with 4. If next Black 'b', the idea is to play White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.




*Dia. 2*      *Dia. 3*

White 20, 22. I didn't feel enthusiastic about these moves even as I played them. Fujisawa Shuko pointed out that for 20 attaching at 1 in Dia. 3 was the only move. If Black 2, White makes good shape with 3; if Black 'a', White counters with 'b' and is unworried.

When Black steps up the pressure with 23, the game becomes a very hard one for White to win. Even so, White has no choice but to try to fix up his position and move out with 24 and 26. Playing aggressively with 28 feels right. The standard joseki of White 'a' — Black 'b' — White 'c' — Black 29 would somehow feel slack. All the same, descending at 28 and invading at 30 lack consistency.

*Dia. 4.* Having played aggressively with the marked stone, White should build a thick position at the top with 1 and 3. This would probably give a surprisingly close game.

If White is going to invade at 30, then playing the standard joseki mentioned above is superior to 28. In any case, invading at the 3-3 point at such an early stage is not like me. Is this really a Takemiya game? I can't believe it.




*Dia. 4*


**Figure 2 (41 – 60).** *From bad to worse*

Black 41 is severe. As for the aim of 42 —

*Dia. 5.* White wants Black to hane at 1 so that he can fix up his shape with 2 to 8. Since he also gets a severe move at 'a', this result would be satisfactory for White.




*Figure 2 (41 – 60)*



*Dia. 5*

7: connects



*Dia. 6*

Yamashiro is not so gullible. He ignores 42 to strike at the vital point of 43, after which he settles his group with 45, a strategic decision that shows good judgement. As for me, my play becomes even more absurd with 46. As anyone can see —

*Dia. 6.* Something like 1 is the move. At the time I was worried about the aji of Black 2. If White has a stone at 'a', he can counter Black 2 by ramming into Black with 7. I was worried about a trifle.

When Black jumps out with 47 and 49, White's position is hopelessly thin. The sequence from 50 is in a sense my privilege, but 52 is so undignified. A professional should simply play 52 at 54.


White 58, 60. If omitted, Black might use the





*Yamashiro plays the first move of the game under the watchful eyes of Otake, the referee.*


peep at 'a' to hack his way through my position — a frightening prospect. However, I wonder if I should have provoked him to do so by playing 58 at 'b'.



*Figure 3 (61 – 100)*

**Figure 3 (61 – 100). Refusing to admit defeat**

When he switches to 61, Yamashiro's game moves into top gear. He probably thought that there was no way he could lose. However, Black



*Dia. 7*

63 is an indiscretion; he should have given priority to extending to 65. If then White 63 and Black 'a', White would have been left without any resources to call on.

White 64 is completely irrelevant, an insane move. Since my opponent didn't play there, extending to 'b' was naturally the only move. Actually I was indulging in some wishful thinking. I thought that 64 would put my opponent on the spot. If Black connects at 'c', White can push through at 'd' and cut; if he connects at 'd', White can push through at 'c'. However, since he has no answer, it's obvious that Black will tenuki. The instant that Black extended to 65, I realized what a mess I had made of things. 'So I'm down 1–2, am I?' I thought to myself. 'No matter. I'll just have to

try all the harder in the fourth game.'

White 70 shows poor fighting spirit. I must have been half asleep. To make sense of 64, I should have cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. After 7, the black stones on the outside are more or less captured. White's sente move at 'a' is also big. This way the game might still be bad for White, but he would still be in the ring.

Black 77 was the last move of the day. When you have played the worst you possibly could, you are released from tension. It's strange, but you even feel carefree: I may be going to lose, but I'm not going to hand my opponent the game on a platter. My sealed move seems to have had a subtle effect on Yamashiro.

White 78 is a really defiant move, a refusal to give up hope. I also considered attacking the black group on the left side, but the prospects of success are faint. With a move like 78, it will take a while before White loses. I can be tenacious. For the player in the lead, moves like 78 are the most disagreeable.

Black 79. One can see that Black is impatient to wrap up the game. Black has presumably calculated that even if he gives up some points, living on the left side will secure the game. At this stage, Yamashiro's approach was too facile — perhaps he was getting nervous. Either turning at 88 or jumping to 98 or 94 would have been better than 79.

Black 85 is one of the factors in Black's defeat. The forcing moves of 79 and 83 may have been insipid, but having played them Black should jump to 94. White feels much more optimistic after he had played the sequence of forcing moves from 88 to 94. In fact, this turns the game around and it is beginning to look like an upset.

Black 97. If Black connects with 'e', White's blockade at 98 becomes sente.

#### Figure 4 (101 – 150). A complete turnabout

The black group on the side is not alive, as White has the sequence of 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. Black plays 1 and 3 to augment his eye shape, but these moves look dubious. Not that it's easy to say where Black should have played.

Dia. 8. The theory was advanced that Black should have played 1, but White would be happy to settle the shape with 2 etc. He captures the three black stones on a large scale.





Figure 4 (101 – 150)

31: ko



Dia. 8

At this stage of the game, Black's lead has already been irreversibly upset.

Incursions of the order of 9 and 19 are easily dealt with by 10 and 22. Note that if Black plays 19 at 'd', White holds him in check with 'e'. Also, if White is greedy with 22, playing at 'f', he is crushed by Black 'd'.









Figure 5 (151 - 194)  
59: ko



Dia. 9

Black 41. The cut at 1 in Dia. 9 is a frightening move, but White 2 is a clever answer: no blood is spilled. If Black 3, White 4. Any move but 2 would mean instant defeat.

Figure 5 (151 - 194). *An undeserved win*

This is a strange game. Since the sealed move White has increased his centre territory by 30 points while Black has accomplished nothing. No matter how bad the game was for White, this could hardly fail to upset Black's lead.

This game had a decisive effect on the course of the Honinbo title match. Yamashiro will probably find it hard to reconcile himself to losing, but there are times when you let slip a good game, even one as good as this.

*Black resigns after White 194.*

Time taken. White: 8 hours 55 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 19 minutes.

('Kido', August 1986)

#### Game Four

This is an extremely complicated game, perhaps the most difficult of the series. In our

commentary we can only hope to give a small idea of its complexity.

White: Yamashiro Hiroshi

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 18, 19 June 1986 in Hiroshima.

Commentary by Ishii Kunio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 44)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 44). *A tough start for White*

White 10 and 12 represent White's strategy for countering Black's moyo. If White plays 10 on the left side, Black will immediately play at 10, enlarging his moyo. When White plays 12, Black has little choice but to go into the corner. If he jumps out, as in Dia. 1, he gets a floating group.

Black goes ahead in territory in the sequence to 19, so White has to invade at 20. The continuation to 32 then seems to flow naturally, but White is not happy with the result. One reason is that Black's jump to 31 serves to erase White's moyo at the top (it works well in conjunction with 17). Yamashiro spent a lot of time after the game going over his play here with Takemiya, then continued analysing it with

Ishii, in an effort to find out where he went wrong. The conclusion he and Ishii finally reached was that 24 was bad; it should have been at 1 in Dia. 2. In this variation, White doesn't have to keep jumping out but can settle his group with 5. The latter move in turn serves to turn Black into a floating group (5 works well with White's solid corner enclosure in the bottom left corner). White can also aim at attacking Black by capping at 'a'.

White 34, ignoring the threat of 33 to attach at 'a', is a bold move; it soon leads to enormous complications.

White 38 is an interesting move. If instead White crawls at 41, Black will be content to force him to live small in the corner.

Black 39 is a move Takemiya was proud of. If White answers at 'b', for example, he is once again forced to live small in the corner. In this position, it seems, that would be unbearable.

Black 43. The only move, for a professional. If instead Black ataris to the right of 36, White makes a ponnuki with 'c', which would help him in the subsequent fighting on the side.

White 44. If White just wants to live on the side, the move is 2 in Dia. 3. The result to 5 would be acceptable if White had a ponnuki at 'b', but as it is Black can cut off the stones below with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'. That means that White would have to take gote after 7.




Figure 2 (44 – 64). The lead switches back and forth.

White 44 is where the game starts to become really difficult, even for top-flight professionals.




Figure 2 (44 – 64)

Both sides make mistakes in the fighting that follows here. White 44 is a subtle move: it keeps the opponent guessing as to whether or not White intends to sacrifice the white stones below. Takemiya gave 44 his seal of approval, commenting after the game that that was where he would have played himself.

Black 49 is a makeshift way of capturing White. The correct move, even though it lets the white group below live, is Black 'a'.

Black's error seemingly induces White to go wrong too: White 50 should be at 'b'. This would not only secure White's large group but also help defend his moyo at the top. In the discussion after the game, Yamashiro wistfully placed a stone on this point again and again.

Black 51 to 55 aim at preventing the white groups from linking up. However, the attachment at 57 is a major blunder that could have swayed the game. Correct here is peeping lightly at 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black 1, White would probably seek life on the side with 2 to 6. Black could then seal in the large group with 7 and 9. After the game Yamashiro commented: 'If Black had peeped, White would have been helpless.'

Black 59. Even now Black should peep. The successive mistakes of 57 and 59 turn the game in White's favour.

After 64 the disadvantage resulting from 57 and 59 is clear to see. White's group on the side looks like living easily; that being so, White's only worry is the threat of Black 'c'.



At this stage, however, the group at the bottom can look after itself by attaching at 'd'; that leaves the upper half of the group, but in stark contrast to Dia. 4, these stones have an unblocked escape route into the centre. White is clearly winning.




Figure 3 (65 - 100)  
85, 88, 91: ko; 93: at 73


#### Figure 3 (65 - 100). A costly misjudgement

White 66 loses the game: it leads to a ko that White cannot win. Black 67 is a very severe move, but Yamashiro did not overlook it; rather he miscalculated the ko threats. First, the correct move for 66 is shown in Dia. 5.

*Dia. 5.* If White plays 1, he can live on a large scale. However, he has to play 5 when Black ataris at 4. Giving up the three stones here is unbearable, but it has to be borne.

White 68. White could live small by crawling at 1 in Dia. 6, but this is likewise unbearable. In particular, letting Black capture the stones below in sente with 4 would be very painful. Yamashiro saw the ko coming after 68, but he made the overhasty judgement that he had enough ko threats to win it.

The continuation to 81 is inevitable. This ko is worth about 60 points. White has two obvious ko threats, at 86 and 'a', with 92 being a probable third. That means that Black needs four threats to win the ko; when Yamashiro played 68, he couldn't see Black getting that many. The problem was that he overlooked Black's threat at 83. As mentioned earlier, Black has the threat




Dia. 5

of attaching at 'b', which becomes a serious threat if he can block off the escape route of the white group above. After 83, Black gets two more threats here, so White's calculations are thrown out of gear.

White 84. The sealed move.

Black 93. A concession. Black has two more ko threats ('c' and 'd') to White's one ('a'), but Takemiya is confident that 93 will win.



Dia. 6





Figure 4 (101 - 150)  
41: at 31

#### Figure 4 (101 - 150). The game's not over yet.

Black 7 and 9 show that Takemiya is confident that he is ahead. If he thought he were behind, he could attach at 'a', and it would be very hard for White to kill him. Again, Takemiya plays simply with 15; he does not need to start a fight by cutting at 16. On being asked later



*Dia. 7*

how far ahead he thought he was, Takemiya replied one and a half points. This was an intuitive feeling rather than the result of exact calculation.

White 36. Yamashiro regretted this move, saying that he should have played the 1–3 combination in Dia. 7. The ensuing sequence is a bit like a trick move; it enables White to make a ponnuki in sente with 13 and 15. This gives White a better result in the centre than he gets in the game, but the atari at 16 is some consolation for Black. White does not upset Black's lead.

Black 41. Black 'b', which helps erase White's moyo at the top, would have been better, Takemiya admitted after the game. Yamashiro goes for the maximum territory at the top with 42 to 44.

Black 47. Takemiya's slip with 41 meant that he had to work hard again for his win. He took 38 minutes making up his mind to play 47. The variations following it are complicated, but he has no choice, as Black 47 at 48 would be bad.

**Figure 5 (151 – 200).** *Takemiya scrapes through.*

The strange-looking clamp of 55 and the bad-shape move of 57 are actually the best defence. Black once again secures his lead.


White 62. White 'a' is better, according to Yamashiro.

White 66 to 70 are preparation for 72. If Black tries to intercept 72 with 73 at 'b', he has no answer to White 'c'. White gains two points in sente in this sequence.


White 80. White 'd' is worth one point more.

**Figure 6 (201 – 253).** *A hard-earned win*

The sequence to 14 is surprising: it shows that the players don't know the Nihon Ki-in rules. By setting up a ko in White's position,



*Figure 5 (151 – 200)*



*Figure 6 (201 – 253)*

*36: connects*

Black is able to eliminate the double ko inside his group at the top. That might be a gain if a ko arose later, but in this game it is irrelevant. Such being the case, there was no need for Takemiya to eliminate the double ko, as according to the Nihon Ki-in rules, the black group is alive. By capturing at 13, Takemiya needlessly reduced his corner territory from eight points to seven. The only one to notice this was Hashimoto Utaro 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, who enjoyed making fun of the players at the party after the game.

The game ends when Black lives up to 53, but



White could have prevented this; he was just looking for a way to resign.

When a reporter congratulated him on a 'convincing win', Takemiya responded, 'Don't be ridiculous. Attaching with Black 57 [Figure 2] was terrible.' However, he did admit that he was a little ahead after the ko fight ended. Despite all the ups and downs after it, that fight did decide the game.

*White resigns after Black 253.*

Time taken. White: 8 hours 52 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 37 minutes.

(Adapted from the Mainichi)

### Game Five

*Kido asked Kato Masao Oza and Ishida Akira 9-dan to analyse the final game of the series. The Kido reporter is Kobori Keiji.*

*Yamashiro fought well.*

Kido: We have asked Kato Masao, who was the referee for the final game, and Ishida Akira, who did the Mainichi commentary, to review the game for us. The series did, after all, finish before the end of the rainy season [around 10 July]. Slight though it may have been, one felt a tangible difference in strength between the two. How did the series strike you?

Kato: Eh? You felt a difference in strength? I can't agree. Yamashiro played very well. Every game was close — Takemiya was in considerable danger.

Kido: The lopsided score of 4–1 reminded me of the Rin–Awaji series two years ago.

Ishida: In content it did not feel like 4–1. Perhaps 3–2 after the fifth game would have been more like it. There were a number of games which either side could have won.

Kato: That's right. Yamashiro may himself have been dissatisfied with his performance, but I think that he did well. This was only his second title match. In the third he'll be a real threat.

Kido: Yamashiro grappled with the Honinbo in the middle of the ring and pressed him hard, but he lacked the ability to make the final push. What do you think was the decisive factor in this year's title match?

Ishida: In fighting spirit they were equal. I can't believe there was much of a difference in strength. In the final analysis, I think the

difference came from Takemiya's greater experience of big matches. He doesn't suffer from nerves. In fact, some people go so far as to say that he hasn't got a nerve in his body. Considering his comparative youth, Yamashiro is not a nervous type, but he's no match for Takemiya.

Kato: Takemiya's go seems to have changed in the last year or so.

Ishida: That's right. A territorial tightness may have been added to his lordliness.

Kido: He's on the path to becoming a great Honinbo. [Kato and Ishida laugh.] But it is a little unsatisfying the way he loses to Kobayashi all the time. . . . Anyway, I would like to offer my congratulations to both players for an exciting series.

*A good game for Yamashiro*

Kato: Yamashiro had a very good position in the final game. In spite of that, he went to pieces in the latter half, perhaps from being too conscious of his lead. This aberration in his play is probably what he regrets most in the series.

Ishida: He certainly did play strangely. The second half of the game was a complete reverse of the first half. But I wonder if Takemiya thought that the result in the opening fight was bad for him. He always looks as if nothing is worrying him.

Kato: He could hardly not have realized that his position at that stage was bad. He played the way you play when you're behind.

Kido: But even though he was behind he was very cheerful after play ended on the first day. . . . I heard that Yamashiro seemed to be a little tense and that he went up to his room early.

Ishida: I don't know if that made a difference, but Takemiya's lucky in having the right temperament. Shall I play the moves? You must be exhausted, Kato.

Kato: I get asked a lot more than before to act as referee. Don't like to think I'm that age already.

Kido: It's easier on the players in a title match.

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Yamashiro Hiroshi

Played on 25, 26 June 1986 at Fukuroda spa in Ibaraki prefecture.




Figure 1 (1 – 21)

**Figure 1 (1 – 21). A new pattern**

Ishida: Takemiya's certainly fond of the star-point.

Kato: Eh? Yamashiro played 1 and 3 here?

Ishida: The referee sees the board from the side. White 12 is Takemiya style. If instead of 13 Black splits up the bottom, then the checking extension (tsume) of White 'a' becomes a good move. It becomes an even better extension than with the joseki when White has made the diagonal connection with 10, followed by a three-space extension. That is why Black immediately extends to 13.

Kido: And White has no hesitation in setting up a sanren-sei with 14.

Ishida: Black 'b' instead of 15 is also a good point.


Kido: Why didn't he play it?

Ishida: If he does, White will extend along the left side, so Black's fuseki becomes slack. There was a game in which White played 16 at 'c'.


Kido: Takemiya v. Honda Kuniyoshi in the Meijin league four years ago. Takemiya had white and played at 16 (Dia. 1).

Ishida: When I mentioned it to Takemiya, he was surprised. Apparently he'd forgotten it. He's an absentminded genius. White won the game in Dia. 1 by half a point — it was a masterpiece for White. A masterpiece from his lordly period when he didn't bother about territory ...


Kido: A new pattern was created in the bottom left corner, and a violent fight arose from it.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Kato: Black thought for a very long time about 17. He wants to make the best use of the large-knight enclosure in the top left corner. The 3-3 invasion in Dia. 2 is often seen.


Ishida: This diagram is the kind of position Takemiya likes. Makes the fans happy too.

Kato: What happens if White hanes at 1 in Dia. 3 with 18? Having Black make the peep at 6 is a gain for White, but Black 8 is a severe move. No, the low move at 'a' is better than 8. There's also the variation in which instead of 8 Black cuts immediately with 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'.


Ishida: Takemiya probably disliked these variations. Even so, drawing back at 18 when Black has a large-knight enclosure above is a new pattern. Black made an approach move immediately at 21, but I wonder about this. I was predicting that he would jump to 1 in Dia. 4 (next page). This makes miai of the approach move at 3 and the extension to 'a' (which is very severe).

Kato: Ah, ah. I see.






*Dia. 4*




*Dia. 5*



*Dia. 6*

Ishida: If White plays 2 and Black later attacks at 'b', then Black 1 will be in a good position. If White 2 at 3, Black of course plays 'a'. The jump to 1 is a powerful move.




*Figure 2 (22 - 40)*

### Figure 2 (22 - 40). A furious fight


Kato: With 23 I was expecting Black to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. I wonder what this leads to.

[There are many variations. Dia. 5 is a representative example.]

Kato: Jumping down with 9 is a good move, isn't it? The question is whether White can



*Dia. 7*



*Dia. 8*

extricate his group with 18. After making the preparatory manoeuvre with Black 'a' through White 'f', pressing at Black 'g' would be just right. It really looks as if Black could have played the hane-invasion combination.

Kido: If Black plays 25 at 1 in Dia. 6, White gets good shape up to 6.

Ishida: Because White 2 is the vital point. White and Black cut through each other's positions with 26 and 27, and the fight comes to a pause with 28. This is the first time this shape has appeared, but probably each side was satisfied. The problems come after this.

Kato: What about Black 29? If I were playing, I would prefer to use the momentum of Black 1 etc. in Dia. 7 to solidify the top left while also gouging out White's area. If White blocks at 3 with 2, Black 'a' makes good shape.

Kido: H'm. This sequence makes the corner really solid. Kato's theory looks good to me.

Ishida: Yamashiro wanted to leave open the option of attacking the white group on the left side. After jumping to 29, he can aim at moves like 'a' and 'b', or perhaps 'c', which has one eye on the corner below.

Kido: The position in the game is subtle. Takemiya decided to start something with 30 and 32. A furious fight follows.

Ishida: Shouldn't White 32 have been at 1 in

Dia. 8? The sequence to 7 is reasonable for White as he gets thickness. Isn't this more like the Takemiya style?

Kato: I see. But Takemiya must have considered the sequence in the figure O.K. for White.

Ishida: Yamashiro wondered about White 34 at 'd', but that doesn't work out well for White. However, White could have played the hane at 'e' instead of 38. That would have been better for White. [Kato and Ishida explored a large number of variations for 34 and 38, but Kido didn't have the space to give them.]




Figure 3 (41 - 60)

Figure 3 (41 - 60). Yamashiro takes the lead.

Kido: What do you think of the result to 54?

Kato: It's clearly good for Black. White's territory on the left side has less than 30 points, but Black's thickness where he burst through White's sanren-sei (2, 4, 14) is fantastic. Note that the four captured black stones give Black lots of sente moves, so he's got thickness in the centre too. If White 40 had been at 'a', Black would have had fewer sente moves.

Ishida: Yamashiro is leading.


Kido: Using his thickness to split White open with 55 feels right.

Kato: Not really. This is Otake's theory, but Black could also make an approach move at 1 in Dia. 9, emphasizing the right side.


Ishida: I see. That's a calm move. It keeps Black in the lead, so it's a wise approach.

Kato: After the sequence in the diagram, White 'b' and Black 'c' would follow at the top.


Kido: Black really defends at 'c'?




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Kato: He's ahead, so he wants to wrap up the game. If Black does make an approach move on the inside, the high move at 1 in Dia. 10 is better. This diagram looks feasible for Black because of the thickness he has in the centre (thanks to the various forcing moves he gets from his four captured stones).

Ishida: That being the case, why didn't Takemiya cap at 1 in Dia. 11 instead of peeping at 56? This is much more in keeping with his style. If, for instance, Black were to cower on the inside with 2 to 8, he would immediately lose.

Kato: White 56 and 58 look panicky — Takemiya must have realized he was doing badly. However, Black's next move, 59 (the sealed move),



is a real Yamashiro move. Staking out a high position with 1 in Dia. 12 (page 32) would be the usual idea.

Ishida: He may have realized full well that that's the usual move but took a chance to make the game easy to count.





Figure 4 (61 - 100)



Dia. 13

12: connects


**Figure 4 (61 - 100).** Yamashiro tries to wind up the game.

Ishida: The continuation to 69 is what Black was hoping for. Instead of attacking, he tries to take the lead in territory.


Kato: However, there was a big pitfall. With 66, White could have cut at 1 in Dia. 13. There is nothing Black can do about this. If White had squeezed and switched to 15, Yamashiro's strategy would have been in complete disarray.

Ishida: This would feel like an upset. Takemiya very much regretted missing this variation.


Kido: There are a lot of problem points in the play at this stage.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Kato (laughing): It was terrible.

Kido: White's invasion at 76, capturing a stone, was said to be worth about 25 points. If it's so big, why doesn't Black defend at the top with 75?

Kato: Black 1 in Dia. 14, eh? Defending would be solid. If White 'a', Black refutes it with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'; the endgame sequence White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'e' is nothing to speak of.

Ishida: I might add that if Black jumps to 'f' with 1, White is left with the invasion point at 'g'. Also, if Black plays 77 at 1 in Dia. 15, White easily lives with 2.

Kato: However, Black is leading. Rather than attacking White's large group with 85 and 87, his aim is to turn the centre into a worthless area, as he has calculated that this would leave him ahead. The calculation itself is correct. However, following Dia. 16 would have been better than Black 93.

Ishida: I agree. On the other hand, Takemiya is playing in his characteristic style with moves like 92: his calculation is based on thickness. Would you like to see an interesting variation, Kobori? White 90 sets up a ladder. If White invades by sheer force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 17, the marked stone is in just the right place for the loose ladder.

Kido: Diagrams like this are exciting, really

exciting.

Ishida: It's a meaningless diagram. The point is just that Black's position in the top left is thin. To begin with, White 'a' would be better than 90; instead of 100, White could then counterattack at 'b'.





Figure 5 (101 - 135)



Dia. 18


Figure 5 (101 - 135). Yamashiro starts to falter.

Kido: The scene where the problem arose is approaching — the process of the upset.


Kato: First of all, when Black plays 5. Black hanes and connects with sente as in Dia. 18, then with 5 pursues a consistent policy of turning the centre into a worthless area. Wouldn't this be a fast way of winding up the game, in true Yamashiro style?

Ishida: Yes, that's true. Takemiya may have heaved a sigh of relief when he played on top of Black with 6.

Kato: The jump to 9 is the second turning point. This jump lacks efficiency. One possibility is to attach and extend with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' in Dia. 19. Another is to



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

Dia. 21

capture a stone with 1, in exchange for White 2. If White omits 2, Black presses him hard with 'd', White 'e', Black 2, White 'f', Black 'g'.

Ishida: After this Black could play normal endgame, forcing with 3 and 5. It rather seems that he keeps a secure lead of ten points on the board.

Kato: Black plunges in with 11, but he has no escape route when White attaches at 16. In that case, it would still have been better to play the crude forcing sequence in Dia. 20.

Ishida: Takemiya probably felt optimistic when he extended at 20. However, the game is still good for Black. Black 21 and 23 are a skilful endgame combination. Territorially White 28 at 29 would be better, but White is aiming at 'a'.

Kato: Black 35 seems to be the losing move.

Ishida: Best is the 1-3 combination in Dia. 21. The beauty of this is that when Black blocks



at 5, 7 and 9 become sente. This would be unbearable for White. I'll leave it to the reader to work out why White is forced to play 8 and 10. In this diagram Black gains two points compared to what happens in the game (37 and 38 in the next figure).

Kato: Those two points make the difference. If White plays 2 at 7, Black 2 is too big.




Figure 6 (136 - 155)  
47: connects

Figure 6 (136 - 155). What might have been?

Kato: The final problem is Black's answer to White 40. Capturing two stones with 1 etc. in Dia. 22 is correct. After Black 13, White hanes at 'a' and connects, Black hanes at 'a' in the figure and connects in sente, then he plays Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' in the diagram. Let's play out the rest of the endgame.


Ishida: One and a half points for White? That means that Black would have won if he'd followed Dias. 21 and 22. Yamashiro lost a lot of points in the endgame. He was too conscious of his lead, perhaps.

Kido: This really was a game that Black should have won. The psychological factor seems to have been most important in the way he missed his chance.

Figure 7 (156 - 202). Takemiya's first defence

[With 55, Black decides to go out fighting. He can't hope to win the ko: White has too many ko threats.]

Black resigns after White 202.



Dia. 22




Figure 7 (156 - 202)

Ko: 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 82, 85, 88;  
90: connects the ko.

Time taken, White: 8 hours 53 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 58 minutes.

('Kido', August 1986.)

After the title match ended, Kido asked the players for their impressions.

Takemiya: Satisfaction from answering the expectations of my fans

I began to worry when I dropped the second game. I felt the pressure from which I had been free till then. The third game also proceeded strangely for part of the way, but winning it seems to have given me a lot of momentum.

The contents? There's no such thing as a game



*A dejected-looking Yamashiro and a relieved Takemiya review the final game as Kato looks on engrossed. For the first time in his career Takemiya succeeded in defending a title. He now takes fifth place in the roll of Honinbo title winners with four titles (after Takagawa on 9, Sakata on 7, and Ishida and Rin on 5).*

free of bad moves. I don't think that a few bad moves matter. Even so, perhaps there were too many.

This is something I've always thought and often said, but the important thing is whether a game can touch the spectators' hearts. I'm already 35; I reflect on whether I've been able to express my approach to life and my sensibility on the go board. From that point of view, I'm satisfied with both the result and the contents of this series. Wouldn't you agree that the first game was a fantastic game?

In a sense, Yamashiro is a little lacking in explosive power, but his game is forceful. If he goes on as he is, I'm confident he's got the qualifications to reach the top. I'm grateful to him for being such a pleasant opponent.

This is the first time I've tasted the flavour of a defence; I'm very happy. Seeing how happy it has made me, I'd like to proclaim that I will defend the title next year too.

Besides, just think how gloomy the go world would be without me.



*'Joshin': purifying the spirit.  
Calligraphy by Takemiya Honinbo.*

*Yamashiro: I didn't have what it takes.*

The third game, after we'd won one and lost one each, was everything. Until the sealed move



I was convinced that I had the game won — that was why I lost. Thinking that it looked as if I could become Honinbo: I was too self-indulgent. I became completely negative and you saw what happened. The result was that the Honinbo saw through me — that's the difference experience makes.

I'm still young, so I should have flailed away without worrying about the result. Before the series began, I said that I'd be happy if I could

win one game, but privately I expected to do better.

I have to start out all over again. If I could discipline myself mentally and get another chance to play Takemiya, nothing would be better. When that happens, I'll pay my debt to him.

(Note: In go, 'paying a debt' means defeating someone who has taught one.)

(Honinbo report translated by John Power.)

## The Secret of Kobayashi Koichi's Strength

*By one of those little ironies of fate, the week after Kobayashi Koichi lost the Meijin title match four straight to Kato, the Nihon Ki-in published, as a special, independent issue of Igo Club, a book entitled A Life Devoted to Go: The Secret of Kobayashi Koichi's Strength, and the opening section of the book was an essay by Kato. It is an excellent book, but Kobayashi must have greeted its publication with mixed feelings, for he was in the depths of his worst*

*slump in many years.*

*His current bad form does not detract from the interest of the book, however, and after all he still has three of the top five titles. We would like to present the three short essays that open the book, together with the only tournament game he ever played with his wife Reiko. The larger part of the book is devoted to memorable games from Kobayashi's career.*

### A Superb Transformation: Kato Masao

Kobayashi's recent momentum is awesome. It's as if his stored-up energy has suddenly exploded. As someone who has known him for a long time and played many games with him, I would like to throw what light I can on the secret of his strength.


#### *Before and after the transformation*

'On actually playing him, I was astonished by how territory-oriented Kato is.' This is a remark Kobayashi made about me around 1977 or 1978. But the speaker of these words has himself made a startling transformation in the last couple of years. Mine was trivial in comparison. The way he has changed is truly astonishing.

*Dia. 1.* This is Kobayashi before his transformation.

The shoulder hit of 9 was a popular joseki at the time, but the resulting shape is quite slack territorially. I'm sure that nowadays Kobayashi would be quite disinclined to play it.

The pattern in the top left corner is also slack territorially. If you disdain territory in two




*Dia. 1. 1976 Gosei tournament*

*Kobayashi (black) v. Kato*

places, you naturally have to stake the game on the centre alone, as with 39 and 51 here. But when White moves out with 52, he need not fear any

really severe attack, so already he is leading.

*Dia. 2.* This is Kobayashi after his transformation.



*Dia. 2. Game 1, 1985 Oza title match  
Kobayashi (black) v. Kato*

When White plays 6 with the 1–3–5 formation, Kobayashi seems to have made it a rule these days to attach at 7 and pull back at 9. This is quite a difference from Kobayashi in the period when he was strongly influenced by Kajiwara's theories. When he was studying under Kajiwara in the 'Sanei Group'\*, Kajiwara would have declared the game over if Black had been foolhardy enough to play 7 and 9. But if you look at Kitani's games, you find that he had no qualms about playing this combination. We used to be very perplexed by this discrepancy.

Black also goes for secure territory on the bottom left; at this early stage he already has three corners. It's hard to credit that this is the same person who played *Dia. 1*.

There are few players who have changed their style from moyo to territory in such a short space of time as Kobayashi. Probably the only similar example is Kitani in his switch from the New Fuseki to a territorial style.

\* A study group for Kitani disciples held by Kajiwara. When Kitani fell ill and became an invalid, Kajiwara took over the training of the most promising Kitani disciples. He trained the great generation of Kitani disciples that included Ishida, Kato, Takemiya, Cho, and Kobayashi.



Why did Kobayashi change? Perhaps my influence partly accounts for it. In the period when we played *Dia. 1*, Kobayashi would often comment: 'If you don't become as territory-oriented as Kato, you can't take a title. First-class players all play a territorial game.'


But my influence was probably minuscule. I think the potential for the change already existed within Kobayashi himself from his low-dan period. In our Kitani School days, Ishida Yoshio stood alone in the speed of his calculation and the precision of his positional judgement. Both Takemiya and I were hopeless in this direction. I can say this without fear of contradiction. For that very reason, both Takemiya and I had to develop a fighting style and a moyo strategy.

Though he played the same fighting style, Kobayashi was a little different. When he had to calculate, he was second only to Ishida. This is a formidable weapon. Even when he was fighting, it gave him flexibility, and he was skilful at winding up the game. This was where he differed from me: if my punch missed and just struck thin air, I would fall to pieces. I think that Kobayashi is what he is today because he cultivated this strong point of his.

*Dias. 1 and 2* show games that went the way I wanted them to. To avoid one-sidedness, I should also show one of his good games.


*Dia. 3 (next page).* This game was a solid win for Kobayashi. It is from the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger held at the end of last year. Kobayashi won this playoff 2–1 and went on to take the Kisei title from Cho.






*Dia. 3. 11th Kisei playoff, Game 1  
Black: Kobayashi; White: Kato*

Black 23, ignoring White 22, was a move with a carefully thought-out strategy behind it. Kobayashi had probably researched it before the game. Black 23 is a ladder block. [The ladder referred to comes up in the variation shown in Dia. 4. When the ladder favours him, Black can turn at 9 instead of the standard move at 10. If the ladder favoured White, he could connect at 'a' with 10, threatening to set up a ladder with 'b'. That means that Black would have to follow the standard joseki in Dia. 5, but then White 2 and 4 would combine well with the white corner enclosure below.]




*Dia. 4*




*Dia. 5*

Black's threat is to cut at 26 after forcing White to defend at 27. I tenukied with 26, but Black got what he wanted when he connected at 27. Actually I overlooked a good combination for maintaining the ladder. White should atari at 1 in Dia. 6, though this is not the kind of move one normally likes to play, then defend with 3. [The reader may like to confirm for himself that White 1 maintains the ladder, but note that it



*Dia. 6*




*Dia. 7*

is the one set up with 5 to 11 in Dia. 7.]


If one studied regularly, one wouldn't get into this kind of trouble. This game taught me the importance of daily study.

Black 31 and 33 are a solid attack, typical of Kobayashi. In this game, he had it all his way. [Since it was an interesting game, the rest of the moves are given at the conclusion of this essay. —Ed.]

At present Kobayashi's territorial style has probably reached its zenith. This can clearly be seen in his games with me. If a joseki that gives a division of territory and influence, as with the joseki to 20 in Dia. 3, appears in one of our games, then invariably I'm the one with the influence and Kobayashi's the one with the profit. Likewise with Dias. 8 and 9. I consider the outside influence superior in each case, but Kobayashi must feel that the profit takes the honours.



*Dia. 8*



*Dia. 9*

*Will Kobayashi's style change?*

However, a style based on calculation cannot continue indefinitely. Ishida no longer calculates as much as he used to, and both Takagawa and Rin switched from a calculating style to a fighting game. Perhaps the ability to make precise calculations is something one can only give full play to for a limited period in one's youth.

I mustn't venture any rash opinions, but in Kobayashi's case, I have the feeling that it is now, when his territorial orientation has reached its peak, that his calculation and his positional judgement are at their most accurate.


So I think that even the all-conquering Kobayashi will find himself coming to a turning point. I will be very interested to see what he does then. Will he try to persist with the Kobayashi style as it is now or will he change his style, the way Kitani did time after time?

As far as our relationship is concerned, I bear a big responsibility for Kobayashi's present domination of the go world. His great winning streak started when he upset my 2-0 lead in the Judan title match the year before last and beat me three straight to take the title. My reprehensible play in last year's Meijin league and the Kisei playoff (Dia. 3), letting him become the challenger in each case, only added to his momentum.

Fortunately, I have become the Meijin challenger this year. I'm determined to scrutinize his play at my leisure and penetrate the secret of his strength. If I am to have a chance to win, it will be when my fighting spirit overcomes his. I intend to put up a fierce fight.


*Below is the continuation of the game given in Dia. 3.*

The result to 40 in Dia. 3 was good for Black, though Kobayashi confessed that he also overlooked the combination in Dia. 6.




*Dia. 10 (41 - 65)*

*Dia. 10.* Kato tried to make up for lost ground by attacking with 48, but this was a bit of an overplay (better was White 55). The fact that White found it advisable to switch to 58 instead of connecting the stone in atari proves this;



*Dia. 11*

if White 1 in Dia. 11, Black just plays 2 to 6, leaving White with no effective way of continuing his attack.




*Dia. 12 (66 - 100)*

*Dia. 12.* Black welcomed the fight after White cut at 66. Note that White cannot play 72 at 74; if he does, Black sets up a kind of geta with Black 'a', White 72, Black 'b' (if then White 'c', Black attaches at 'd'; if instead White 77, Black hanes at 'e').

White was forced to play 84 and 86 to secure his group, so Black wrested the initiative from him with 87. His attack at 93 led to a ko.







*Dia. 13 (101 - 133)*  
8: ko; 10: connects (at 5)

*Dia. 13.* Kobayashi was content to compromise with 9 instead of persisting with the ko. White 16 was a desperation measure; competing in territory with a move like White 'a' would have lost by a long way, but White's prospects of living with 16 were minimal. All in all, this game was a good demonstration of the Kobayashi style in action.

### A Champion Long-Distance Runner Rin Kaiho

In a magazine commentary about ten years ago, I stated: 'The player most skilful at winning a won game is Kobayashi.'

Ten years ago Kobayashi was a promising young player, but he was still a long way from the top. Apparently my fellow professionals were surprised when I praised him in the above fashion. My opinion has remained unchanged and his achievements are proving that I was right. I feel entitled to boast of my foresight.

#### *A complete switch in go style*


Winning a won game: this may seem like nothing special, but there is nothing more difficult. In my case, I seem to score more wins in games that are tough for me, by a ratio of 6 to 4. If you are ahead, you get nervous; if you are behind, you fight your hardest and this leads to an upset. One's moves are affected by the position. But since his youth Kobayashi has been

different. His dexterity and sureness in turning a winning position into a won game are an inborn weapon.

In other respects, however, he has changed a great deal. To list some of the attributes of his old style that struck me:

1. He emphasized attack.
2. He used to fall behind when his attacks failed to come off.
3. In positional judgement, he was an optimist.
4. He often used to play thickly even when this caused him to fall behind.

In a word, these four attributes belong to his attacking period.



*Dia. 1. 1973 Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship*  
White: Rin; Black: Kobayashi

*Dia. 1* shows a game from this period. If I remember correctly, it was our first newspaper game. I'm sure that Kobayashi nowadays would be astonished at how slack Black's play is territorially.


White 16 and 18 were a popular pattern at the time, but the cut of Black 21 was dubious. Nowadays Kobayashi would slide to 'a' instead. He was apparently surprised when I pushed up along the sixth line with 24 etc. However, the invasion at 30 worked perfectly: the development of the game is unsatisfactory for Black. My tenuki in response to the atari of 41 also seems to have taken him aback. When I made the pincer at 44, the game was already promising for me.

After this, I steadily piled up the points and had no trouble running away with the game. This may not be a suitable example, but I think it does show the tendency he had to undervalue territory.

As I see it, Kobayashi's attacking period continued until about five years ago. Then he made a radical transformation. The transformation was so abrupt that it was startling. He switched from attack to territory. It would be interesting if one could discover the reasons why he changed so suddenly. Either it came from a realization that he had to become more territory-oriented to record stable results and take titles or perhaps it was the influence of Kato and Cho.

As you know, he made a 180-degree turn and started winning everything. Yet at one stage, in my opinion, he was biased too much towards territory. He gave up attacking and concentrated exclusively on taking profit. About two years ago, he corrected this bias and improved the balance of his game.

These days I can't find any fault in Kobayashi. He is not biased towards attack, he doesn't go too much for territory. His analysis is accurate, there is no self-indulgence in his positional judgement. And he is just as strong as ever in winding up a game. His strength in the latter part of the game perhaps even surpasses Cho's.




*Dia. 2. 1984 Meijin league  
White: Rin; Black: Kobayashi*

*Dia. 2.* This is a game which made the differences from the old Kobayashi really come home to me.

Answering White's invasion at 12 by settling the shape with 13 and 15 shows how territory-oriented he has become. In the old days he would probably have attached on top at 17, letting White link up underneath with 'a' etc. Takemiya or Kato might play 13 at 17.

His play on the top right also astonished me. The old Kobayashi, with his preoccupation with attacking, would probably never have dreamed of discarding the stone at 33. I was grateful for the chance to seize this stone with 36. In the local context, there's no doubt that White can be satisfied. But Kobayashi accepts this. He gives White what is his due, on the basis that he gets a reasonable game when he takes sente and switches to 39. If you don't have an outstanding sense of territorial balance, you can't hope to play like this. Blocking at 41 also shows decisiveness. The conventional wisdom of go makes one reluctant to play moves like this, but Kobayashi rationalizes that it gives an adequate result, so he plays it. This freedom from indecisiveness is one of the major features of his game.



*Dia. 3 (44 - 77)*

*Dia. 3.* This is the continuation. For some reason, when the opponent looks calm and collected, one starts to feel panicky, that one has to start something. Normally my natural instinct would be to play a tight, restrained



move like White 53 instead of starting a fight with 48.

The wedge at 62 is also not in character for me. White 48 and 62 are the spectacular kind of moves that Kobayashi used to be so good at. Our go styles were completely reversed here.

What most impressed me in this game was Kobayashi's coolness in deciding that he could afford to sacrifice the centre. You can only play like this when you are constantly monitoring the overall position. I think that the game was actually quite close when Black captured the three centre stones, but I was overcome by Kobayashi's skill in winding up the game. At any rate, I honestly feel that I cannot point to any defects in his game.

*It all comes down to self-confidence.*

In the old days Kobayashi was a spectacular player who would try to knock out the opponent with one punch. He would get carried away with

his own aggressiveness. But that doesn't work against top-class players. You don't often come across a move that can win the game at one blow.

So Kobayashi switched to playing the averages, piling up the points. When all is said and done, go is a long-distance race. You have to run at a steady pace through the opening, the middle game, and the endgame, and pull ahead of the opponent with a little spurt when you near the goal. In my opinion, Kobayashi understands this aspect of go better than anyone else.

It all comes down to self-confidence. You win, so you gain confidence in your own style. If you have self-confidence, you win all the more. Everything clicks.

But though he seems to be completely free of flaws, even Kobayashi must have weak points somewhere. At present I can't see them. But since I am fighting in the same arena, it behoves me to search them out.

### Talent Plus Effort: Ishida Akira


In explaining Kobayashi's strength, there's a tendency to mention first his single-minded devotion to the game, the amount he studies. I have no argument with this, but I don't think that effort or study is everything.

In the go world at present there are any number of players who work harder than Kobayashi, who study more. I very much doubt that they will surpass him. If you could become Meijin just through hard work and study, then every Tom, Dick, and Harry would become Meijin. The real world is not like that. I imagine that Kobayashi himself is unhappy at the stress laid on how much he studies.

Well, what is the real nature of his strength? His go itself is strong. Ever since he was young, he has had a brilliance. I don't want to boast, but I can claim to have correctly evaluated his strength a long time ago.

*Dia. 1.* Letting White rap him on the head at 1 is painful for Black. At least, that would be the usual perception. But Kobayashi doesn't feel the pain. I don't want to plagiarize Kajiwara, but how can you cope with someone with no feelings? I found myself at a loss.

But when you consider it carefully, you realize that not feeling the pain is correct. After 2, White connects at 3, and Black has to




*Dia. 1. 1976 Prime Minister's Cup.  
Kobayashi (black) v. Ishida Akira*

'push the cart from behind', as the proverb has it, with 4 to 8. According to the conventional wisdom of go, this is bad, as White keeps one step ahead of Black in extending into the centre, but the two marked black stones are solidly ensconced at the top, limiting the effectiveness of White's thickness. What's even

more important to Kobayashi is the fact that, though one step behind, Black builds thickness up to 8 that has to be of use in attacking the white group on the right side. He puts this plan into effect with 10.

Even a run-of-the-mill go player might be able to carry things this far. When White plays 11, we see the difference between someone who ends up as a run-of-the-mill player and someone who becomes Meijin and Kisei. An ordinary go player would be bound to push at 'a'. White will be happy to pull back at 'b'. Imagining that this exchange has spoiled White's shape is wishful thinking. The hane of White 'c' gives White sente moves around 'd', so this white group is not as weak as it looks.




*Dia. 2*

*Dia. 2.* Kobayashi played the kosumi of 1. The duffer's kosumi? Nonsense! If you hypothesize White 2 to Black 11, you find that Black 1 is the most severe move for usurping White's eye space.

Black 1 or Black 'a'? A difference of one line, but it spells the difference between a Meijin and an ordinary go player. At the time I had a premonition that Black might, just might, attack at 1.

*Dia. 3.* This is the continuation. White fought well, dodging the rain of blows from Black.

White 32 was an oversight. I failed to see that I could not escape after Black's atari at 33. Disheartened by this slip, I played the



*Dia. 3 (1 - 51)*

losing move with 44. The 45-47 combination cleverly rescued the black group, so the game was lost.

Kobayashi would not have got upset by a small oversight; likewise, even after Black had lived on the left side, he would have kept playing his hardest if he had been white, but I was already dispirited. In spiritual strength, there is a big difference between us.

I became professional shodan one year earlier, but otherwise Kobayashi and I progressed at the same rate (for part of the way, that is). Ever since we were low-dan players, I've run into him in all kinds of tournaments and on every occasion I've suffered. But for Kobayashi I might even have taken a title by now. He is my nemesis.

#### *The talent to make efforts*

I stated that there are many people who study more than Kobayashi; it's also a fact that there are players with more talent than Kobayashi.

I hesitate to name names, but, for example, there's Otake. Actually, Otake possesses a magnificent talent, and I think him a great genius equal to Dosaku and Shusaku. In musical terms, he's in Mozart's class. If Kobayashi and Cho were reared by the go board, then Otake was born from it.

However, at the present Kobayashi clearly ranks above Otake. This shows what a profound



game go is. If you ask why, we return to the problem of effort. I don't want to oversimplify and say that Kobayashi studies hard and Otake takes it easy, but there is a decisive difference in the intensity of their devotion to go, their hunger to win.

When you keep on winning, you can't help losing your hunger to win. This tendency was even apparent in, of all people, Cho Chikun. Your income increases, everyone fusses over you. So it's understandable, but . . . What will happen if Kobayashi keeps on winning in the same way? I have the feeling that he might be able to retain his hunger to win virtually for ever. That's why he's such a frightening player. I'd like to have a look inside his brain.

Since Cho's name has come up, I would like to introduce an interesting theory of Kamimura Kunio's, a drinking pal of mine. Cho and Kobayashi are the two players most renowned for the amount they study, but he says there's a difference in the nature of their study. Cho studies to refine his art, Kobayashi in order to win. I feel Kamimura has something. From an

art-for-art's-sake point of view, most people might evaluate Cho's approach more highly. However, there's not much difference, I feel. An effort to refine one's art leads to winning, and an effort to win more leads to refining one's art. And if it's a question of which approach is harder on the player, striving to win is much tougher. You have to discard the pleasurable side of the game, so you can't take refuge inside go.


I've got a long way off the topic, but what I want to say is that the secret of Kobayashi's strength is that with him the three elements of spirit, technique, and body are perfectly matched. Spirit means making efforts. Being able to devote oneself to study without being distracted is a considerable talent. In this respect, someone like me is greatly inferior to Kobayashi. And not just in mental attitude — I can't match him in technique or body either. But even so, even though I can't rival him, I can more or less make a contest of it. This is the strange thing about go. I hope the reader will forgive my conceit.

### An Unforgettable Game: Kobayashi Reiko

I played many games with Koichi in the Kitani school, but this is the only official game we ever played.

When I captured the white stones in the bottom

left (Figure 1), I felt that I was ahead. But Koichi didn't give up the fight; occasionally muttering 'I don't know', he searched for a way to turn the game around. In the end I made an



20th Oza tournament, 2nd prelim. (10 Nov. 1971)  
White: Kobayashi Koichi 5-dan; Black: Kitani Reiko 6-dan.  
Figure 1 (1 – 70)




Figure 2 (71 – 150)  
Ko: 109, 112, 117, 120, 123, 126, 129, 132, 135, 138




Figure 3 (151 – 246). Black resigns.  
Ko: 75, 78, 83, 92, 95, 98, 101, 106

overplay and destroyed myself.

This game reinforced the impression I already had of Koichi that he never loses heart, that he has the spiritual strength to struggle against adversity.



*Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan*

Born 1939, the daughter of Kitani Minoru. Reiko became professional shodan in 1956, 6-dan in 1968. She won the 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th and 18th Women's Championships. In 1971 she took 8th place in the 8th Pro Best Ten. She has also won four women's TV titles. She married Koichi in 1974.

This is a game which I will never forget.


(‘Igo Itchokusen: Kobayashi Koichi no Tsuyosa no Himitsu.’ Translated by John Power.)

## Good Style and Correct Shape

Rin Kaiho


*This series is concerned with the elements that make up good style and correct shape. The aim is to make a practical analysis of important fighting techniques in a number of basic patterns that occur regularly in actual play. We hope*

*that you will be able to apply this knowledge in analogous situations in your own games. The aim is not to give you set sequences to memorize but to develop your intuitive grasp of the game.*



*Problem 7. Black to play*

White has just cut with the marked stone. What is the best way for Black to counter? The problem for Black is to cover his weak point at ‘a’ and to make best use of his marked stone. His answer is virtually a joseki.



*Problem 8. White to play*

Black has just crawled with the marked stone. White’s three stones to the right only have three liberties, so White has to be very careful in this fight.

*Answers on page 48.*




## Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers


*Continued from page 47*

*Answer to Problem 7*

Dia. 1 (crude). A beginner instinctively wants to atari at 1. Since this becomes a diagonal connection, it seems to make good use of the marked stone. But you must not forget that White can now atari at 4, forcing Black to make a heavy, overconcentrated shape. If you look at the result to 6, you will realize that the marked stone is now superfluous: it is not doing anything. On top of that, the two black stones on the left have been greatly weakened.




*Dia. 1: crude*




*Dia. 2: correct*

Dia. 2 (the natural flow). Black ataris at 1, forcing White to play 2, then connects at 3. This is the 'natural flow' of the stones. It serves to make the marked stone participate directly in the fighting. Next —

Dia. 3 (strongest). If White turns at 1, Black could answer peacefully at 'a', but he has a stronger move: the hane at 2. If White cuts at 'a', Black gets a satisfying squeeze with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.



*Dia. 3: strongest*




*Dia. 4: analogous*


Dia. 4 (application). This case is analogous. How should Black respond when White cuts with 1 and 3? Black 'a', letting White extend at 'b', is the worst move.

Dia. 5 (a geta). Black plays the 1–3 combination. White escapes with 4 and 6, but Black had no way of preventing this anyway. However, he can now capture the two white stones in a geta with 7, getting the best result he could hope for here.

Dia. 6 (the simple connection). If Black just



*Dia. 5: best*




*Dia. 6: second-best*


connects at 1, the moves to 5 will follow. White would never exchange White 'a' for Black 'b' now, but in effect he has made this disadvantageous exchange in Dia. 5.

**Answer to Problem 8**

Dia. 1. The problem is that White 1, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b', is too slow. Black captures first with 2.



*Dia. 1: too slow*



*Dia. 2: the key point*

Dia. 2. Starting with the hane at 1 is the key. This is an immediate threat to Black, so he has to atari at 2, then capture at 4. This means that, in contrast to Dia. 1, White has managed to play 3 in sente. White 5 then captures the black stones. If Black resists with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White extends at 'd' and it's all over.


Note that the timing of 5 is important: White must play here immediately after Black 4.

Dia. 3 (not sente). Playing White 1, forcing Black 'a', before the hane at 'b' might seem to give a superior result, but the problem is that Black will ignore 1, capturing the three key stones instead with 2. Of course, capturing with 'a' gives what looks like a reasonable result for White, but this is a separate problem.


Here is a similar position.

Dia. 4 (the ladder). When White cuts with 1, Black resists with 2 and 4. White can play the same tesuji if the ladder is favourable for him, but what should he do if the ladder does not work?


Dia. 5 (failure). The aim of White 1 is to



*Dia. 3: wishful thinking*




*Dia. 4*




*Dia. 5: too slow*

make miai of 'a' and 'b', but if the ladder favours Black he will simply block at 2 and win the fight.

Dia. 6 (geta). White has to keep Black short of liberties by making the hane at 1. If White



*Dia. 6: a geta*



*Dia. 7: enough*

can play 5 in sente, then he can set up a geta with 7.

Dia. 7 (profit enough). Black can, as before, ignore 1 in favour of blocking at 2. However, White gains a satisfactory result by capturing at 3.

Playing 1 at 'a' looks possible but it doesn't work. After Black 'b', White 1, Black 'c', White is forced to extend at 'd', so Black has time to block at 2. This would be a setback for White. Nonetheless, White 'a' is a sharp idea and in a different position might be very effective.

(*'Kido'*, April 1986)

## Redmond v. Kojima

*The game below is Michael Redmond's first win in an even game against a 9-dan. It may be one of the turning points of his career. (Ed.)*


White: Michael Redmond 5-dan

Black: Kojima Takaho 9-dan


Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

2 October 1986. Gosei 2nd prelim. round.


*Commentary by Michael Redmond.*



*Figure 1 (1 - 28)*



*Dia. 1*



*Dia. 2*

**Figure 1 (1 - 28)**

With 14, the normal move was 'a', but I tried 14 as an experiment. In return for 15, I took the initiative on the left side with 16.

Black 17 was correct, preventing White 'b'. If Black had played 19 at 23, I would have invaded at 28.

White 22 was a mistake: I should have cut at 1 in Dia. 1. Black 2 would be the strongest response. Connecting up with 3 to 7 would be better than the actual game. I considered 3 in Dia. 2, but Black 6 would be a strong counter. The moves to 14 would follow, and Black would have a superior position. White 7 at 'a' would be countered by Black 9.

Black 27 was greedy: he should have played at 'c'. Black 27 gave me the forcing move of 30 (in Figure 2).








Figure 2 (29 - 56)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (29 - 56)


White 30. This forcing move made a lot of difference in the fighting on the left side. It threatened 1 in Dia. 3. After 5, Black would be dead, losing the semeai by one move. Dia. 4 shows a way to make life, but the loss would be too big, giving me eyes and territory in the corner.

Having 30 on the board stopped Black from playing 35 at 1 in Dia. 5. The marked stone makes the watari to 8 possible, giving White the advantage.


White 40 made miai of 41 and 42. If Black had answered 40 with 'a', it would have been a kikashi [a forcing move that gains something] compared to Black 40, White 'b'.

Black 43 was a good move, attacking my side group and preparing to capture the lower right corner. I lived in sente up to 53. I was ahead at this point.

White 54 was a bad mistake and would have been the losing move if I had lost. The correct move was 1 in Dia. 6. Because of the presence of the marked stones, Black would have no choice but to answer submissively up to 10. This exchange was necessary before 54. Black seized the



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

chance to attack first with 55, which was a severe move.

Figure 3 (57 - 100)

Black forced me to connect with 64, then took profit in the centre with 65. Although I captured four stones up to 78, the result was very bad compared to Dia. 6. If Black had tried to save his stones with 77 at 1 in Dia. 7, I would have broken through into his side with 2 to 6.

Black 83 and White 86 were miai. After 99, 100 was necessary to prevent Dia. 8.





Figure 3 (57 - 100)


Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Black 17 was a probe. If I had played 20 at 'a', the corner would have been a seki, but instead I played 20, making White 21 sente next, but leaving some ko aji.

Black 27 was a very small move. Maybe Black thought it was sente. If he had played 27 at 50,




*Dia. 7*




*Dia. 8*

he would have won easily. I took profit in the centre and the game became close.



*Figure 4 (101 - 150)*



*Figure 5 (151 - 200)*


*Ko: 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87;  
ko (at 63): 89, 92, 95, 98*

### Figure 5 (151 - 200)

After I lived up to 58, Black started the ko in the lower right corner. White 62 was a ladder break and also threatened to cut at 'a'. Black 63 was correct in this case, making a two-step ko.

I did not have enough ko threats to win the ko. White 88 was the biggest endgame move and also made some ko threats on the upper side.


Black 97. A good move, giving me the fewest ko threats.



*Figure 6 (201 - 250)*

*Ko: 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19; 21: connects (right of 1); 45: at 18*






*Dia. 9 4: connects*

**Figure 6 (201 – 250)**

Black 25 was the losing move. If Black had played the squeeze in Dia. 9, I would have been in damezumari (shortage of liberties). The endgame after 32 was straightforward.




*Figure 7 (251 – 292)*

**Figure 7 (251 – 292)**

*White wins by 3½ points.*


## Tesuji Magic

Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan




*1. Black to play*

Timing is everything in this problem. White's defects will be his undoing — if you exploit them properly.




*2. Black to play*

The right half of White's group can't be touched, but the left half is vulnerable. Can you find the move that will give White a nasty shock?



*3. Black to play*

This is an endgame problem. What is the most profitable way for Black to play?



*4. Black to play*


Is it possible to make two eyes for this group? If you don't watch out, White will reduce you to one large eye (nakade), thus killing the group.

*Answers on page 54*

# Three Trick Moves

Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan


In the positions below, White has played the 5-4 point, a move which emphasizes influence. When Black enters at 1, which is the standard move, White can use his high position to make some very severe attacks on Black. The important thing for Black is not to be cowed by White's high-handed tactics. If Black keeps his head, he can stay out of trouble.



1. Black to play


How should Black deal with the irregular pincer at 2?

*Answers on page 56*



2. Black to play


White 2 looks leisurely but is actually a strong move. Black should avoid fighting and keep things simple.




3. Black to play

White 2 looks absurd, but losing your temper won't help. You have to answer it coolly and calmly.


## Tesuji Problem: Answer




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

## Tesuji Problem: Answer

*Continued from page 21*

Dia. 1. Even if you can't see exactly how it's going to work, it's obvious that Black 1 is the only move that has any chance of linking up the two groups. The problem is what happens next. If White 2, then Black 3 is the wrong continuation, as Black has no answer to White 6. Of course, if White played 'a', Black could link up with 6, but White won't be so generous.

Dia. 2. The tesuji is Black 3. You can confirm for yourself that White now has no way of stopping Black from connecting his groups.

Dia. 3. If White counters with 2 instead of 'a', Black has the tesuji of 3 ready. Next —

Dia. 4. If White blocks at 1, Black counters by connecting at 2. The best White can do is to set up life in gote with 'a', but in the meantime Black links up with 6. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 5. If Black tries to kill White with 1 and 3, a ko follows. Black should check his ko threats carefully before trying this.

Dia. 6. The conclusion is that White should capture with 4, letting Black connect along the edge with 5.

(*'Let's Go'*, October 1984)




## Tesuji Magic: Answers

*Continued from page 52*


### Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The kosumi at 1 may look like a tesuji, but it leads nowhere. After 4 —


Dia. 2. If Black 1 and 3, White just connects at 4; if then Black 'a', White 'b' is enough. It looks as if Black has gone astray in his timing.




*Dia. 1: a pseudo-tesuji*



*Dia. 2: failure*



*Dia. 3: correct timing*




*Dia. 4: a risky ko*

Dia. 3. Black must start by striking at White's weakest point, which is 1. If White 2, Black 3 now works. After 5, White can't atari on either side, so Black picks up six stones. Instead of 4 —


Dia. 4. White might try playing a ko with 1, but this is dubious: he now risks losing everything. As a problem, this ko might be the correct answer, but in an actual game White could hardly take the chance.

Dia. 5. If White answers 1 by capturing with 2, Black wins the fight in the corner with 3 and 5.

Dia. 6. Connecting at 2 leads to a similar result. White has no answer to Black 1.




*Dia. 5: Black is happy*




*Dia. 6: similar*

### Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 hardly constitutes an attack: White makes his second eye easily with 2 and 4.




*Dia. 1: wrong*




*Dia. 2: wrong follow-up*

Dia. 2. Black 1 is more positive: this is the right idea. Unfortunately, Black is let down by his poor follow-up at 3. White does even better than in Dia. 1, getting a six-point eye.

Dia. 3. The next idea that will occur to most people is to play the follow-up 'tesuji' of 3. This looks good, as White can't atari, but White has a clever indirect answer. He captures three stones with 6 and 8; if Black then plays inside (to the left of 6) to stop him from getting two eyes here, he ataris 1 and 3, capturing them.



*Dia. 3: the wrong tesuji*




*Dia. 4: correct*


Dia. 4. The tesuji is Black 3: this is an exquisite move. Next —

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black makes a sacrifice with 2. After White captures with 5 —


Dia. 6. Black ataris at 1 and White finds that he has run out of liberties. He has no time to



*Dia. 5*



*Dia. 6: dead*



*Dia. 7: dead*


capture the three black stones to the right.

Dia. 7. If White plays 3 in Dia. 5 at 1 here, Black saves his three stones with 2 and kills White anyway.


#### Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. The ordinary move at 1 achieves nothing for Black, though it does serve to earn White's gratitude.


Dia. 2. Later White 1 and 3 are almost certain to be sente. Compared to the correct answer given below, Black loses two points.




*Dia. 1: uninspired*



*Dia. 2: a two-point loss*



*Dia. 3: the tesuji*



*Dia. 4: unreasonable  
6: connects (at 1)*

Dia. 3. Black 1, cutting across the knight's move, is the tesuji. Rather than reducing


White's territory, Black's aim is more to secure his own. If White intercepts with 2, Black has a good counter at 3. White 4 is forced, so Black can play 5 in sente. White's territory is unchanged, but Black has two points more than in Dia. 2. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 4. White cannot counterattack with 2. Black squeezes with 3 and 5, capturing all the white stones.


#### Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black does not have time to make a leisurely move like extending at 1. White links up his three stones by thrusting in at 2. After 6, the black group is dead.


Dia. 2. Black therefore tries the hanekomi of 1, his follow-up being the atari at 3, but when White captures at 4, Black is doomed to die. That may seem hard to believe, but —




*Dia. 1: dead*



*Dia. 2: dead*



*Dia. 3: nakade  
2: tenuki*




*Dia. 4: only one eye*


Dia. 3. Black has no choice but to capture with 1 to 5. However, White 4 makes a six-stone nakade (a sacrifice that reduces the opponent to one large eye), so after Black takes the stones off the board —

Dia. 4. White just plays inside at the key point for making eyes. Black cannot live. This six-stone nakade is known as 'flowery six' and is the largest nakade.

Dia. 5. If Black tries sacrificing two stones with 3 here instead of 3 in Dia. 2, White simply links up with 4, and Black dies. If Black 'a', White 'b'.




*Dia. 5: dead*




*Dia. 6: the vital point*





*Dia. 7: a live*




*Dia. 8: alive*


Dia. 6. The important point for Black is that he must forestall White 'a' while also preventing White from creating a nakade shape. The only move that satisfies both these requirements is Black 1. It gets Black out of trouble.

Dia. 7. If White 2, Black connects at 3 to stop White from linking up to the right. After this, there is nothing that White can do: whatever happens, Black gets his eye shape. We can confirm this.

Dia. 8. This will be the shape after Black



*Dia. 9: alive*



*Dia. 10: alive*

captures the white stones. Since it is a bent-four, Black is alive.

Dia. 9. If White played 2 in Dia. 7 one line higher, we would get this shape. It's close to the 'flowery six' shape, but the vital difference is the addition of the marked stone. This stone guarantees life.

Dia. 10. If White continues after Dia. 7 by capturing the black stone, this will be the shape when Black captures White.


(*'Let's Go'*, October 1984)

### Three Trick Moves: Answers


*Continued from page 53*

#### Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The contact play at 1 is the move that White is waiting for. With 2, he drags Black willy-nilly into a fight. After 8 –




*Dia. 1: what White wants*




*Dia. 2: good for White*  
17: at 11; 18: at 13;  
23: at 11; 24: at 10

Dia. 2. Black 9 is the strongest move. In the sequence to 25 Black saves his stones, but White is happy because he can now tenuki. This result is unfavourable for Black.

Dia. 3. The best idea is to keep things simple. Separating the white stones with the



*Dia. 3: correct*




*Dia. 4: satisfactory*


kosumi of 1 is correct. White will attach at 2 in an attempt to spoil Black's shape, but all Black has to do is to answer coolly with 3 and 5. Next –

Dia. 4. If White answers at 1, Black easily moves out into the centre by applying pressure to the group on the right with 2 and 4. After 6, White will have to find a way to reinforce his stones at the bottom. Black is satisfied.

Dia. 5. If White answers with 2, pushing along with 3 is correct shape. In the continuation, Black takes profit in sente, so this is also satisfactory for him. If he preferred, Black could move out into the centre with 5 at 'a'.



*Dia. 5: profit*



*Dia. 1: a tough fight*

#### Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. In this position too we can't recommend the contact play at 1. White will hane at 2, making the continuation to 11 probable. It is clear that Black is under pressure.

*Continued on page 64.*


# The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. White has just pressed with the triangled stone in the upper right corner, and three proposals are being made for Black's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?



*Dia. A*



*Dia. B*



*Dia. C*

A: As far as I can see, this is not very much of a problem: Black has to crawl at 1. It's tempting to resist, but Black wouldn't gain anything from it.


B: With all the josekis available, I can't believe anyone would want to crawl. Where's your fighting spirit? Regardless of what happens, Black must push through and cut.

C: I certainly agree that fighting spirit is important, but playing a move without any regard for the consequences is just reckless. Nor do I like crawling, either. How about lightly jumping out to 1?

## Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the positions at the top and on the right side will determine the choice of joseki.






*Fuseki Diagram*

In the lower right corner, White has taken profit while Black has built influence. Because Black has played one more stone, his position is extremely strong. Note, however, that it is open at 'a', making the right side an uninteresting area.

In the upper left, Black has pincer with the circled black stone, White has jumped out, and Black has extended with the triangled stone. The exchange of the circled white stone for the triangled black stone is a gain for Black and a loss for White. White needs to make up for this loss by attacking the circled black stone.

As part of this strategy, White has pressed with the triangled stone in the upper right. His



*Dia. 1*

plan is to force Black along the right side so that he can build thickness to attack the lone black stone at the top more effectively. He is not at all concerned about letting Black play on the right, since it is a valueless area. Black of course should not be a willing partner in this strategy.


In this fuseki, it should also be noted that the bottom is where Black has potential for development. His aim will be to expand his moyo here even more. The left side, like the right side, is an unimportant area.

Black's choice of joseki should therefore emphasize the center and bottom.


### B Wins the Debate

The correct move is Black 1 in Dia. 1. As B insisted, Black should not think twice about pushing up and cutting (despite the fact he usually has a stone at either of the points marked 'a' when he chooses this joseki). Although played on its own the joseki does not turn out well for Black, in this fuseki it is just right.


After the cut at 3 in Dia. 2, White usually extends at 4. If he blocks at 1 in Dia. 3, his position is uncomfortable when Black hanes. After White 4 in Dia. 2, Black extends at 5 in Dia. 4. White now has the choice of playing 'a' or 'b'.




*Dia. 2*



*Dia. 3*



*Dia. 4*




*Dia. 5*

White often plays 1 in Dia. 5 to settle his stones quickly when Black has a pincer around 'a'. By forcing Black's two stones in the corner into action, he is able to tidy up his own shape.


After Black 2 and White 3, Black attaches at

4. (Crawling at 'b' is bad because White is strengthened when he jumps to 'c'.) White cannot hane at 'd' because of Black 'e', so he pulls back at 5 in Dia. 6. He then extends to 7 when Black pulls back at 6.

Because Black's marked stones are a burden to him, this exchange favors White. Note also that if White blocks at 'a', Black is alive with 'b'.




*Dia. 6*




*Dia. 7*


If Black does not have a pincer at the top, White usually jumps down to 1 in Dia. 7. After Black 2, White plays the stylish kosumi at 3. If Black tries to push through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, White stops him nicely with 2 and 4.




*Dia. 8*



*Dia. 9*




*Dia. 10*




*Dia. 11*

What White 3 in Dia. 7 defends against is Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. White actually has ten ways, 'a' to 'j' in Dia. 10, to defend, but the advantage of the kosumi is that it gets him one step further into the center (compare, for example, with 1 in Dia. 11).

If Black does not want to let White play the kosumi, he must first push through with 2 in Dia. 12, then block at 4. White must connect at 5. Unfortunately for Black, the exchange of 2 for 3 is the same as if he had tried to cut the bamboo




*Dia. 12*




*Dia. 13*

joint in Dia. 11 — in effect, filling in one of his own liberties. He therefore has little choice about blocking first at 4.

After 3 in Dia. 13, Black must make life in the corner with 4. Black 1 in Dia. 14 may look like a sharper move, but after the sequence to 6 Black still needs another move to make his corner alive (the hane at 1 in Dia. 15 kills it).




*Dia. 14*




*Dia. 15*

Black 4 in Dia. 13 is gote, but Black has no choice. The difference of one move in the midst of a fight like this, however, is crucial.

After Black 4, White descends at 5 in Dia. 16, then extends to 7 when Black blocks at 6. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 17 are also sente, but Black is unconditionally alive. By contrast, the descent at 5 lets White aim at the placement at 'a'. (As we will see later, White cannot play it now.)



*Dia. 16*




*Dia. 17*

The fight comes to a pause with Black 8 and White 9 in Dia. 18 (next page). (Black 'a' also seems possible.) Locally at least, since the fight has been much tougher for Black than for White, one can conclude that Black's play has been unreasonable.

Playing the joseki in Dia. 18 in this issue's




fuseki, however, is a different story, as Black 13 in Dia. 19 combines perfectly with the marked stone to hem White in. (White will probably choose White 6 here instead of sliding at




*Dia. 18*

1 in Dia. 5.) An added bonus is that Black 'a' would put White in grave danger, so White must add a move. White 14 in Dia. 20 is about the best he can do, but playing on the second line is painful.

Black next spreads out with 15 (or 'a') and




*Dia. 19*




*Dia. 20*

17 in Dia. 20, forcing White to answer with 16 and 18. Black 19 then gives him a magnificent moyo stretching from the bottom to the center. If White tenukies with 16, Black 'b' is severe; if he tenukies with 18, Black 'c' is severe.




*Dia. 21*

Since the result in Dia. 20 is so good for Black, White would like to resist with White 14. One possibility is 1 in Dia. 21. If Black answers with the nadare pattern of Black 3—White 2—Black 'a', he can probably handle the fight. A simple way, however, is to hane at 2 and extend at 4 when White cuts with 3. White, without a good continuation, ataris at 5 in Dia. 22. Black counterataris at 6 and extends at 8 when White captures.




*Dia. 22*



*Dia. 23*

Blocking at 1 in Dia. 23 instead of extending at 8 lets White cut at 2 and extend at 4. This is not a good result for Black because of the size of White's territory.

After Black 8 in Dia. 22, White cannot permit Black to descend at 'a', so he hanes at 9 in Dia. 24 and links up with the corner with 11. Black 12 next is severe, and with 14 (or 'a') Black catches up with White. When White settles his




*Dia. 24*

stones with 15, Black jumps to 16, getting an even more majestic moyo than in Dia. 20.


Note that in the upper left corner Black could play 'b', forcing White to answer at 'c'. Black holds this exchange in reserve to leave the option of attaching at 'd'.

Some readers may be worried about whether Black is alive or dead in the upper right corner. The shape, of course, is the notorious carpenter's square.



*Dia. 25*


If White has no weaknesses on the outside, as in Dia. 25, then the placement at 1 results in a ko. Black's only response is to attach at one of the one-two points, at 'a' or 'b'. Whichever




*Dia. 26*

one Black plays, White hanes from the opposite side. Thus, if Black plays 2 in Dia. 26, White hanes at the top at 3. Black next backs off at 4 in Dia. 27, then throws in at 6 to create the ko.


White goes wrong if he hanes on the same side




*Dia. 27*




*Dia. 28*



*Dia. 29*




*Dia. 30*




*Dia. 31*

as Black's attachment, at 3 in Dia. 28. Black turns in at 4 in Dia. 29 and gets a seki in the sequence to 8.

Black goes wrong if he blocks with 4 at 1 in Dia. 30. White extends at 2 in Dia. 31 and creates a dead shape in the continuation to 6.




*Dia. 32*




*Dia. 33*

Fortunately for Black, however, White's position in this issue's fuseki is not as solid as that in Dia. 25. If White makes the placement at 1 in Dia. 32 and hanes at 3, Black should by all means block at 4. After the same sequence to 8 in Dia. 33, White does not have time to play 'a' because of Black 'b'.

Black could also attach at 2 in Dia. 34. He again blocks at 4 when White hanes and follows



*Dia. 34*




*Dia. 35*




the same sequence to the capture at 8 in Dia. 35 (previous page). Because of the defect at 'a', White does not have time to play 'b'.

Black must be careful not to lose both of these sequences, since the corner will then revert to ko. If he loses either one, he will have to add a move to make the corner unconditionally alive.



*Dia. 36*




*Dia. 37*


Note that Black is still safe if White switches 5 in Dia. 33 to 1 in Dia. 36. Black connects at 2, which leads to the seki shown in Dia. 37. If White plays 3 at 4, Black lives with 5.

### A's Proposal

A proposed crawling at 1 in Dia. 38. Locally this is the only move. After 2 and 3, White extends to about 4. There are many possible continuations after 4, but all focus on the point at 'a'.




*Dia. 38*




*Dia. 39*

If Black plays the joseki in Dia. 38 in this issue's fuseki, White will take the excellent point at 4 in Dia. 39. Although Black pokes his head out with 3, it has no meaning, since the side is a valueless area. White, however, by attacking the marked black stone, will be able to erase Black's thickness at the bottom. Note also that White can push at 'a' in sente, whereas if Black plays the sequence Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd', White does not mind. Black is faced with an uphill struggle.



*Dia. 40*

If instead of pressing at 1 in Dia. 39 White pincers at 1 in Dia. 40, Black will play the kosumi at 2. This result is a little unsatisfactory for



*Dia. 41*


White and it is the reason he presses first to the left of 1 in Dia. 39.

In Dia. 39, Black has docilely fallen in with White's plans. Instead of jumping with 3, he could at least consider crawling one more time with 3 in Dia. 41. If White extends at 4, Black could extend at 5. The result here is even, but the fact still remains that he has missed a chance to take the lead by pushing through and cutting. (White, incidentally, might omit 4 to pincer at 'a'.)


White's continuations after 5 are 'b' (followed by Black 'c' and White 'd'), 'e', and 'f'.

### C's Proposal


C proposed jumping to 1 in Dia. 42. This jump is not a joseki move. Moreover, cases in which it would be appropriate are so rare as to be virtually nonexistent. White can be satisfied with the position as it stands.




*Dia. 42*



*Dia. 43*



*Dia. 44*




*Dia. 45*


White punishes Black for his mistake by pushing through with 2 in Dia. 43 and pulling back at 4. Black wants to extend at 5 in Dia. 44, but White's cut at 6 is difficult to handle. If Black captures with 7 and 9 in Dia. 45, White gets a ladder, winning the exchange. If Black connects at 8 with 7, however, he loses the two stones in the corner.

If the ladder does not favor White, he simply cuts on the other side, at 1 in Dia. 46. When Black captures, White ataris with 5 in Dia. 47, forcing Black into a low position.


In this issue's fuseki, White will immediately



*Dia. 46*



*Dia. 47*



*Dia. 48*

pincer at 2 in Dia. 48, treating the exchange of the marked white stone for Black 1 as a forcing move. As we noted before, if White pincers at 2 without pressing first with the marked stone, Black can play a kosumi at the same point.


The result in the diagram is the same as if White had played 2, Black had jumped to 1, and White had peeped with the marked stone. Since there is little difference between this diagram and Dia. 39, Black has played into White's hands.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, May 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)



### Three Trick Moves: Continued from page 56

Dia. 2. The marked white stone is in an ideal attacking position. Black manages to live up to 23 but at the cost of giving White massive thickness.




Dia. 2: good for White

Dia. 3: simplest

Dia. 3. Black 1 keeps things simple. The idea is to strengthen the corner and avoid complications. If White 2, Black attaches at 3.

Dia. 4. If White intercepts with 1, the moves to 6 are forced. The ponnuki gives White good thickness, but Black takes considerable profit. The result is equal.




Dia. 4: equal

Dia. 5: a joseki

Dia. 5. If White answers at 2, Black attaches underneath at 3. White can't hane at 5, so he has to answer at 4. The result is once again a division of profit and influence. This is a joseki.

### Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. I hope that none of my readers would be tempted to answer at 1. This lets White have his own way, giving him a perfect blockade with 2 to 10.




Dia. 1: bad for Black

Dia. 2: also wrong

Dia. 2. Attaching underneath at 1 is bad here. When White counters with 2 and 4, Black has to extend at 5, but after 6 and 8 White will capture one of the black groups, as the reader can con-

firm for himself.

Dia. 3. Black 1 is a calm counter: Black strengthens himself while keeping the white stones separated. If White 2, Black presses down on the white stone. White will have to desert it, for crawling along the second line would give him a terrible result.




Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 4: correct

Dia. 4. If White descends at 2, Black jumps out on the fourth line at 3. Black 4 next would make superb shape, so White has to play there himself, but then we get a similar result to Dia. 3 when Black plays 5. In these two variations there are no weak points for White to aim at.

Dia. 5. If Black wants to go for sure profit, he could play 1 and 3 here. White cuts at 4, but Black takes profit in sente up to 9. Unavoidably, of course, this gives White outside influence.



Dia. 5: an alternative

('Let's Go', October 1984.)

### Go World News: Continued from page 6

#### James Kerwin Go Workshop

James Kerwin, who became a professional shodan in 1978, will teach a 5-day go workshop at the Hollyhock Farm retreat center in British Columbia, July 21 – 26, 1987. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop will be followed by dan-level and kyu-level tournaments. This will be an exciting week of go in a beautiful country setting. For registration information contact Hollyhock Farm, Box 127, Manson's Landing, B.C., VOP 1K0, Canada. Or phone (604) 935-6465.

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